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INTELLIGENT DESIGN
CHRISTOPHER BUCCAFUSCO,† MARK A. LEMLEY,†† & JONATHAN
S. MASUR†††
ABSTRACT
When designers obtain exclusive intellectual property (IP) rights in
the functional aspects of their creations, they can wield these rights to
increase both the costs to their competitors and the prices that
consumers must pay for their goods. IP rights and the costs they entail
are justified when they create incentives for designers to invest in new,
socially valuable designs. But the law must be wary of allowing rights
to be misused. Accordingly, IP law has employed a series of doctrinal
and costly screens to channel designs into the appropriate regime—
copyright law, design patent law, or utility patent law—depending upon
the type of design. Unfortunately, those screens are no longer working.
Designers are able to obtain powerful IP protection over the utilitarian
aspects of their creations without demonstrating that they have made
socially valuable contributions. They are also able to do so without
paying substantial fees that might weed out weaker, socially costly
designs. This is bad for competition and bad for consumers.
In this Article, we integrate theories of doctrinal and costly screens
and explore their roles in channeling IP rights. We explain the
inefficiencies that have arisen through the misapplication of these
screens in copyright and design patent laws. Finally, we propose a
variety of solutions that would move design protection toward a
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successful channeling regime, balancing the law’s needs for incentives
and competition. These proposals include improving doctrinal screens
to weed out functionality, making design protection more costly, and
preventing designers from obtaining multiple forms of protection for
the same design.
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INTRODUCTION
When designers obtain exclusive intellectual property (IP) rights
in the functional aspects of their creations, they can wield these rights
to increase both the costs to their competitors and the prices that
consumers must pay for their goods. IP rights and the costs they entail
are justified when they create incentives for designers to invest in new
socially valuable designs. But the law must be wary of allowing rights
to be misused. Accordingly, IP law has employed a series of doctrinal
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and costly screens to channel designs into the appropriate regime—
copyright law, design patent law, or utility patent law—depending
upon the type of design. In doing so, it seeks to strike a balance
between under- and over-protection and to ensure that stronger rights
over functional elements are limited to those who satisfy the higher
threshold of utility patents. The objective is to prevent designers from
obtaining “backdoor patents” through another IP regime.1
IP law in the U.S. has two primary regimes for promoting
creativity in the aesthetic or ornamental aspects of product design:
copyright law and design patent law.2 In theory, these separate regimes
exist to handle different sorts of products, with different sorts of costs
and benefits arising from IP protection.3 Copyright protection is
available for any works that are at least trivially original, it arises
without registration or substantial examination, and it lasts for about a
century.4 Design patent protection, by contrast, is only available for
ornamental inventions that are novel and nonobvious, it requires an
application and pre-grant examination to commence, and it lasts for
only fifteen years.5 Based on these differences alone, any rational
designer would clearly prefer copyright protection over design patent
protection.
Traditionally, however, copyright law’s useful articles doctrine has
prevented many designers from taking advantage of its lower threshold
and longer duration.6 The useful articles doctrine channeled functional
designs into the design and utility patent regimes rather than the
copyright regime.7 Only works that had significant, independent
aesthetic content—and only that aesthetic content—could receive
copyright protection. Any aspect of a design that was partly functional
could not be protected under copyright.8
While copyright law typically screened out functional aspects of
1. Two of us have discussed the social value of screening out functionality elsewhere. See
generally Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103 VA. L. REV.
1293 (2017). We won’t repeat that discussion here.
2. See infra Part II.C. A third regime—trademark law—is also sometimes used to protect
designs. We treat trademark law separately in this Article.
3. By “product design” we refer to a wide variety of products in the fields of applied art and
industrial design, including consumer electronics, clothing, bicycles, furniture, and automobiles.
4. See infra notes 84–96 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 122–26, 152 and accompanying text.
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”).
7. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1327–32.
8. Id. at 1328.
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works from protection, design patent law made it easier to protect
functional creations. Design patent protection is supposed to extend
only to the ornamental aspects of a work, but design patent law—
unlike copyright law—has traditionally afforded at least some
protection to parts of a work that are both ornamental and functional.9
This grant of IP rights over partly functional elements is
important. When IP law grants protection to useful or functional
features of a product rather than merely aesthetic or ornamental ones,
it can convey substantial market power.10 This market power imposes
costs on both consumers, who must pay higher prices, and subsequent
designers and inventors, who must license the existing IP or find ways
to design around it.11
If IP law allows claimants to gain some protection for functional
aspects of a design, it should not do so easily or cheaply. It should insist
that they have contributed something of high value, and it should be
circumspect about the protection it offers. The most direct way of
accomplishing this is for IP law to channel designs into the proper IP
regime: copyrights for designs that are purely ornamental, design
patents for hybrid ornamental designs that are mixed with some
functional elements, and utility patents for truly functional elements.
In this Article, we explain how IP law can and should use two separate
techniques—doctrinal screens and costly screens—to perform this
channeling function.
Doctrinal screens use substantive legal rules that exclude certain
sorts of claims from a given regime. Different IP regimes’ varying
creativity thresholds and functionality prohibitions are doctrinal
screens. For instance, the rules governing functionality in copyrights,
design patents, and utility patents are canonical doctrinal screens. So
too is the rule that a designer may obtain a design patent only if she
demonstrates that her design is new and nonobvious or that an author
obtains a copyright only if her work is original.
Costly screens, by contrast, channel designs into different regimes
by altering the costs of obtaining rights.12 Costly screens influence
9. Id. at 1350–51.
10. See infra notes 37–45 and accompanying text (explaining why functionality can lead to
market control).
11. See Christopher Buccafusco, Stefan Bechtold & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Nature
of Sequential Innovation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2017) (describing and analyzing the
choice between using existing IP and inventing around it); see also infra note 45 and accompanying
text.
12. David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV.
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creators’ behavior by changing the price of access to legal rights.
Applying for a patent can be costly and time consuming; an applicant
must usually hire a lawyer and pay various fees imposed by the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO). Copyright registration, by contrast,
costs very little, and registration isn’t even required for a copyright to
exist. In this Article, we demonstrate how IP law can effectively use
doctrinal and costly screens in tandem to optimize design innovation.
The system that has been in place for channeling designs between
copyright, design patent, and utility patent laws should work well if it
were operating as intended. Copyright law has a low creativity
threshold—because the designer need not demonstrate novelty and
nonobviousness—and no costly screen. But copyright has also
traditionally had a strict doctrinal screen based on functionality that
should channel designs that incorporate functional elements toward
design patent law. There they would meet a high doctrinal creativity
screen (novelty and nonobviousness) and a costly application screen.
The combination of high doctrinal and costly screens should ensure
that inventors obtain some control over functional elements only when
they have created designs that are genuinely innovative and likely to
generate substantial social value.13
Unfortunately, however, the actual operation of IP law’s
channeling techniques is very different. Neither copyright law nor
design patent law applies the sorts of screens that theory and law
require. First, consider copyright law after the U.S. Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands.14 That opinion
fundamentally altered copyright law’s functionality screen, potentially
allowing highly functional products to obtain copyrights.15 As a result,
a variety of products that the law had excluded from the realm of
copyright may now be able to take advantage of its low creativity
threshold, lack of examination, and long duration to gain competitive
advantages over functional product features.
Things are even worse in design patent law. As discussed, design
patent law is built around three limitations: a doctrinal screen (a high
creativity threshold), a costly screen (expensive examination), and a

677, 681 (2012) (discussing the social value of costly screens); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens
and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 699–702 (2010) [hereinafter Masur, Costly
Screens].
13. We discuss the operation of these screens in detail infra Part II.
14. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
15. See infra notes 181–97 and accompanying text (discussing Star Athletica).
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short duration (fifteen years of protection).16 In fact, though, none of
these limitations have proved especially significant. The creativity
threshold is trivially low, and examination costs would deter virtually
no potential claims. And while design patent duration is relatively
short, the difference between it and copyright duration is often
insignificant. Many designs have useful lifespans of only fifteen years
or fewer.17 Thus, design patent law, as it currently operates, also isn’t
making effective use of doctrinal or costly screens.
For example, numerous design patents cover incredibly trivial
ornamentation. Examples include a triangular marking post,18
crisscrossed straps on a sports bra,19 a walrus plush toy,20 or a skullshaped vodka bottle.21 All of these designs cleared the PTO’s novelty
and nonobviousness screens, and all of the patents have been asserted
in litigation against competitors.22
What is more, the plaintiffs’ design patent rights won’t be limited
to nonfunctional aspects of their designs. In Sport Dimension, Inc. v.
Coleman Co., Inc.,23 the plaintiff asserted a design patent that covered
the highly functional shape of a life jacket flotation device with
armbands.24 Nevertheless, in a 2016 opinion, the Federal Circuit held
that the design’s functional elements, not just its ornamental elements,
were covered by the design patent.25 This substantially broadened the
plaintiff’s design patent rights to cover the design’s utility. The opinion
gave the plaintiff the ability to block competitors who attempt to
market flotation devices that perform the function in the same way,
even if they have no desire to copy the ornamental elements of the
flotation device. This will increase costs to other designers and,
16. See Sarah Burstein, The Patented Design, 83 TENN. L. REV. 161, 171–73 (2015).
17. See infra notes 239–40 and accompanying text.
18. U.S. Patent No. D525,721 (filed July 25, 2006).
19. U.S. Patent No. D709,668 (filed July 29, 2014).
20. U.S. Patent No. D780,854 (filed Mar. 7, 2017).
21. U.S. Patent No. D589,360 (filed Mar. 31, 2009).
22. See Complaint at 13, Quan v. Ty, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-05683 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 3, 2017)
(plush toy, supra note 20); Complaint at 11, Lululemon Athletica Canada, Inc. v. Under Armour,
Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00915-UNA (D. Del. filed July 7, 2017) (alleging patent infringement upon the
sports bra patent, supra note 19); Complaint at 7, Globefill Inc. v. Maud Borup, Inc., No. 0:14-cv04776 (D. Minn. filed Nov. 17, 2014) (vodka bottle, supra note 21). For more examples, see
DESIGN LAW, design-law.tumblr.com [https://perma.cc/7C59-ZC3D] (last visited June 30, 2018).
23. Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., 820 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
24. Id. at 1318–19. The design, shape, and placement of the armbands were determined by
the size of human bodies and their ability to keep the wearer afloat, making them highly
functional. That is, for these types of flotation devices, function determined form.
25. Id. at 1322–23.
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ultimately, to consumers.
Worse still, under current interpretations of the law, creators need
not choose whether to acquire a copyright or a design patent or a utility
patent; they can potentially obtain all three. That means that errors in
either copyright or design patent can multiply.
In sum, then, the problem is simple: it is too cheap and too easy to
get design protection from various IP regimes, and the current rules
make design protection too strong. The operation of these laws does
not sufficiently protect consumers or promote ongoing innovation.26
Solving this problem is trickier, and it involves understanding the
related roles of doctrinal and costly screens. We offer a series of
suggestions to bring design protection more in line with its goal of
improving social welfare. First, we might require designers to elect
either copyright or design patent protection, or at least require
designers to disclaim any copyright term after design patent protection
ceases. That was the rule before 1974, and it would solve many of the
problems that stem from overlapping protection.27 Second, we could
weaken the rights that both copyright and design patents provide, thus
reducing the incentive to overclaim design rights. While Star Athletica
is a large step backward in this regard,28 courts still have room to
reinvigorate the doctrinal screens governing copyright and design
patents. And both the PTO and the courts could begin applying an
appropriately rigorous creativity threshold for design patents.
Congress could also step in to prevent abuse of design rights, for
example, by incorporating an independent invention defense into
design patent law. Finally, consistent with one author’s previous
work,29 it may be that it is simply too cheap to obtain strong design
rights. We suggest that the PTO increase application and maintenance
fees for design patents and use the money for improved examination.
Our aim is not to render design protection ineffective. Nor is it to

26. See Mark P. McKenna & Christopher Jon Sprigman, What’s In, and What’s Out: How
IP’s Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 491, 543 (2017) (arguing that we
may need stronger channeling doctrines between utility patents and other doctrines). Thirty years
ago, Jerry Reichman worried that we might face the opposite problem—not enough protection
for designs. J.H. Reichman, Design Protection and the New Technologies: The United States
Experience in a Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 6, 14 (1989). But the law has
changed dramatically since then, so our worry now is too much protection, not too little.
27. In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1394–96 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
28. See infra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
29. Fagundes & Masur, supra note 12, at 692 (discussing the social value of costly screens);
Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 12, at 687.
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debate whether design rights are a good idea at all.30 Rather, we assume
that there will be some protection for designs; our goal is to try to align
the private and social value of design rights in IP to prevent
overclaiming and abuse of those rights. As the system currently stands,
that means we need to make design rights weaker, harder to get, or
both.
In Part I, we explain why functionality is important to the choice
of IP regimes. In Part II, we discuss the theory behind doctrinal and
costly screens and how Congress attempted to use them to channel
designs into the appropriate IP regime. When operating properly, these
screens could provide appropriate incentives to designers while
minimizing social costs. Unfortunately, as we document in Part III,
design screening is not working, leaving us with a system that may be
the worst of all possible worlds. In Part IV, we offer several possible
solutions to this problem.
I. THE CENTRALITY OF FUNCTIONALITY
Copyrights and patents exist to encourage the production of
socially valuable creations and innovations by granting people certain
exclusive rights to the works and inventions they produce.31 When
authors and inventors obtain these rights, they can charge higher prices
for the goods that embody their works and inventions than they
otherwise could.32 These higher prices provide an economic incentive
to engage in the costly efforts that creating and innovating entail.33
But IP rights also impose costs of their own. By granting some
people rights to make certain products, IP laws make purchasing those
30. For scholarship engaging with this debate, see Sarah Burstein, Costly Designs, 77 OHIO
ST. L.J. 107 (2016) [hereinafter Burstein, Costly Designs]; Burstein, supra note 16; Peter Lee &
Madhavi Sunder, The Law of Look and Feel, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 529 (2017); Mark P. McKenna
& Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2013).
31. Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Intellectual Property Law and the
Promotion of Welfare, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 2 (Ben Depoorter & Peter Menell eds., forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2905936 [https://perma.cc/4EQH-FV9S].
32. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003).
33. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[Copyright]
is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of
exclusive control has expired.”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The
patent laws promote this progress [of science and useful arts] by offering a right of exclusion for
a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time,
research, and development[,] . . . [thereby introducing] new products . . . into the economy . . . .”).
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products more expensive for consumers, many of whom will be priced
out of the market.34 In addition, IP rights also can impose substantial
costs on other creators who want to develop their own works and
inventions or improve existing ones. They now have to pay license fees
or engage in expensive and risky efforts to design around existing
rights.35 For these reasons, IP laws—including those that protect
design—attempt to balance the incentives provided to the current
round of creators and the costs imposed on consumers and the next
round of creators.36
At the center of this question is whether or to what extent the IP
right can be used to protect functional aspects in claimed works and
inventions.37 Society stands to benefit when innovators develop new
techniques to build safer buildings or more efficient appliances, or to
better treat diseases.38 But often there are only a limited number of
ways to design functional products.39 Scientists and engineers have only
discovered so many ways of safely and effectively treating high blood
pressure or designing anti-lock brakes. This means that granting
inventors exclusive control over the functional features of product
design can also give them substantial market power and enable them
to price access to those products far above their marginal cost.40 For
34. Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An
Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 282 (2014);
Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 129, 129 (2004).
35. Buccafusco, Bechtold & Sprigman, supra note 11, at 5 (noting that subsequent inventors
can “build around” existing inventions); Lemley, supra note 34, at 142–43.
36. See generally Lemley, supra note 34 (discussing how IP protection affects the incentives
of creators, consumers, and subsequent inventors).
37. This is not the only reason for the doctrinal differences between the regimes. Scholars
have asserted numerous rationales to explain, for example, why copyright and patent laws impose
different creativity thresholds. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1 (3d
ed. 2013); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441
(2010) (using the psychology of creativity to analyze the differences in protectability standards
between patent and copyright law); Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90
VA. L. REV. 465, 495 (2004); Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 MO. L. REV. 29, 34 (1983).
38. See Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 34, at 283–84.
39. One example is the pocket multi-tool described by U.S. Design Patent 707,091. The
device comprises several tools built into one small structure, including a bottle opener,
screwdriver, smartphone kickstand, set of hex wrenches, and so forth. The device is only able to
perform these functions because of its shape and design, and thus design and function are
inextricably linked. Nonetheless, the PTO allowed a patent on the device, which the owner
asserted. See, e.g., Caffeinate Labs, Inc. v. Vante, Inc., No. 16-12480-GAO, 2017 WL 2889031, at
*2 (D. Mass. July 6, 2017).
40. We do not suggest that exclusive rights covering aesthetic or ornamental aspects of
product design could never convey market power. If they did not provide at least some ability to
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example, pharmaceuticals sell for much higher prices when they are
covered by a patent than after generic producers have entered the
market.41 By contrast, taste is less limiting than utility. You may really
want the new Taylor Swift album, but it has alternatives: you don’t need
it in the way you need a cancer treatment. There are many other
differences between these IP regimes, including the damages that
plaintiffs can obtain and the defenses available to accused infringers,
and we will discuss a variety of these distinctions. But our focus is on
functionality, because it is through the protection of function that a
creator can most easily turn a design right into a powerful market
position.
Accordingly, IP law must be careful about granting exclusive
rights to functional features of products. The utility patent regime is
the principal home for scientific and technical inventions that improve
the ways products work.42 But a variety of utility patent law doctrines
stringently police access to exclusive rights. An inventor seeking a
utility patent must prove that her invention is “novel”43 and
“nonobvious”44—not only that she is the first to create it, but also that
it is more than the predictable combination of preexisting elements.
The inventor must also demonstrate that the invention is useful and
describe how it should be used.45 All of this must be proved to the
satisfaction of an examiner at the PTO before a utility patent is issued.
Utility patents also require the payment of substantial fees, both to
obtain the patent and to keep it in force for its full lifetime.46
Given these high demands on functional inventions, some
innovators attempt to skirt the rigors of utility patent law by seeking
price products above marginal cost, copyrights and design patents would have no meaningful
incentive effects. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke?
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055 (2012) (making this point). We merely
claim that, given a certain scope for IP rights, those covering functional or utilitarian aspects of
design are likely to convey more market power because of the limited range of competitive
options.
41. See Rena M. Conti & Ernst R. Berndt, Specialty Drug Prices and Utilization After Loss
of U.S. Patent Exclusivity, 2001-2007, in MEASURING AND MODELING HEALTH CARE COSTS 273
(Ana Aizcorbe, Colin Baker, Ernst Berndt & David Cutler eds., 2018).
42. McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 26, at 504 n.45.
43. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
44. Id. § 103 (“[A patent] may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the claimed
invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been
obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”).
45. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
46. See infra Part II.C.1.
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protection through either the copyright or design patent regimes.
These types of rights can amount to “backdoor utility patents.”47 A
designer would not be able to patent the wheel, because she is not the
first inventor. But if she can get a copyright or trademark in the round
design, she might effectively get some of the same control over the
wheel without having to clear utility patent law’s novelty and
nonobviousness hurdles. Thus, the copyright and design patent regimes
must themselves police creators who attempt to gain IP protection for
functional features of their products without spending the time and
money and meeting the higher standards of utility patent law.48
Ideally, utility patent, design patent, and copyright laws work
together to appropriately channel different kinds of creations into the
correct legal regime—the one that maximizes the law’s benefits net of
costs. In the next section we explain the tools the law uses to perform
this channeling. Before we do so, however, we should explain why, for
now at least, we focus primarily on utility patents, design patents, and
copyrights, rather than trademark law. Although each of these fields
falls under the rubric of intellectual property protection, their
foundations differ in important ways. Congress’s power to grant
copyrights and patents is grounded in the Progress Clause of Article I,
section 8 of the Constitution.49 Copyrights and patents are intended to
stimulate creativity and innovation. In the context of product designs,
this means that Congress should use its power to grant copyrights and
patents over product designs to optimize innovation.
Trademark law is—or at least is supposed to be—different.
Congress’s power to establish and protect trademarks comes from the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.50 That power is exercised, not
47. See Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1305; Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and
Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1473, 1523–24 (2004).
48. See generally Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1301–03 (highlighting the
anticompetitive implications of an improper balance between copyright law and utility patent
law); McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 26 (highlighting the inconsistent line-drawing in different
IP regimes); Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 611 (2014)
(advocating for a bright-line rule rejecting copyright protection for industrial designs); Pamela
Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright and Patent Protections, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493 (2017) (listing strategies for navigating the boundaries between
copyright law and utility patent law).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
50. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
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primarily to promote creativity and innovation, but rather to protect
consumers from confusion in the market.51 Trademarks, which can
include the design of a product or its trade dress, prevent consumers
from being misled about, for example, whether a particular shoe is
made by Converse or not.52 To the extent that Congress allows
designers to claim exclusive rights to product designs via trade dress
law, it is not doing so to promote innovative designs. But because trade
dress does, in fact, affect innovation in design, we address its
interactions with copyright and patent law in Parts III and IV.
II. SCREENS AT THE INTERSECTION OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGN
PATENT
Before the government awards a valid design right to a private
party, it must have some way of determining that doing so will further
the goals of the IP system. One way to do this is to limit protection to
designs that meet certain doctrinal thresholds.53 A court, and
sometimes also the PTO, scrutinizes the design to determine whether
it warrants protection under the relevant IP doctrines. But doctrine is
only one tool for screening out designs that do not deserve protection.
The government also uses costly screens—fees and other expenses that
someone seeking an IP right must pay—as a means of screening out
rights that would do more social harm than good.54
These two approaches can be complementary and are frequently
applied in tandem. Indeed, doctrinal screens often serve as a driver of
costly screens. The higher the doctrinal threshold that a party must pass
51. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 32, at 167–68; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A.
Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 786
(2004) (“[T]rademarks contribute to economic efficiency by reducing consumer search costs.”);
Nicholas S. Economides, Trademarks, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 601, 602 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (describing the savings for consumers in
product searches as one of “[t]he primary reasons for the existence and protection of
trademarks”); Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP.
523, 525–27 (1988) (discussing the economic benefits of marks that apprise consumers of products’
unobservable features). See generally Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007) (arguing that trademark law before the
20th century was based on unfair competition rather than consumer protection, but noting that
they are both serving similar goals in protecting a functioning market).
52. For additional examples, see Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 167
(1995); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992).
53. See Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer & Christopher Jon
Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 1921, 1923–31 (2014).
54. Fagundes & Masur, supra note 12, at 684; Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 12, at 693.
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in order to claim a right, the more that party will have to spend—in
attorney’s fees and other costs—in perfecting and obtaining the right.
And the more expensive it is to obtain the right, the more valuable it
must be to make it worth the trouble of trying to obtain it. The laws
establishing utility patents, design patents, and copyrights, and
delineating the boundaries between the three, all balance the costs and
benefits of rights provision. Importantly, however, each of these fields
attempts to strike this sort of balance in different ways. They differ in
terms of how easily rights are granted, and with respect to the scope
and duration of the rights that people receive. Accordingly, the screens
that separate the three fields, and that separate protectable from
unprotectable creations within each field, are different as well.55
In the sections that follow, we describe the operation of these
screens and the ways in which they do or do not achieve optimal policy
objectives. First, however, we begin by describing the operation of
screens in general and the manner in which they are designed to
function.
A. The Theory Behind Doctrinal and Costly Screens
As we discussed in Part I, IP protection involves tradeoffs between
social benefits and costs. The goal of the IP system is to grant rights
only when doing so will produce net social benefits.56 In addition, the
strength of the IP right determines both the incentive it creates to
produce further creativity and also the costs it imposes on third parties.
The stronger the right, the greater the incentives it creates, but also the
greater the costs it imposes. Given a menu of different IP rights, the
legal system should grant the appropriate right to maximize net social
benefits relative to other kinds of rights.57 Screens affect these tradeoffs
by ensuring that not every right is granted to every party that seeks it
and that the parties who do get rights get the appropriate ones, neither
too strong nor too weak.
Accordingly, one naïve theory of screens would hold that stronger
IP rights should be accompanied by higher and costlier screens.58
Before a party can obtain a more valuable right, it should be forced to
pass a more rigorous test, satisfy a higher legal standard, pay higher

55. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1301.
56. See Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 38, at 4–5 (explaining the policy aims behind a
coherent system of IP rules).
57. Id.
58. See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 12, at 704 (describing and rejecting this theory).
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costs, and so forth. This approach is facially plausible and perhaps
intuitively appealing, but it is also wrong. The reason is that the
objective of a screen is not merely to impose the highest hurdles to the
strongest or most powerful IP rights. Some of the strongest rights are
also the most socially valuable, in that they have encouraged the most
beneficial research.59 Strong rights may be necessary to provide
powerful incentives to create. Rather, the objective of a screen is to
separate those rights that are socially beneficial from those that are
socially harmful, not necessarily the weak rights from the strong.60
Moreover, in the case of designs, where creators have multiple options
for obtaining IP rights, the objective behind these screens is to channel
creators into selecting the type of IP protection that will generate the
greatest social benefits net of costs.61
As noted above, we can limit access to IP rights in two
fundamental ways: by imposing doctrinal barriers a creator must clear,
or by raising the cost of obtaining a right. We call the former approach
a “doctrinal screen” and the latter a “costly screen.” Doctrinal screens
and costly screens operate in slightly different ways. A doctrinal screen
acts as a firm bar against certain types of design rights. If the design
does not satisfy the necessary doctrinal conditions, it does not qualify
for protection. A properly calibrated doctrinal screen will refuse
protection to designs when the social costs of granting a design right
outweigh the benefits. Consider, for example, a creativity threshold for
IP rights. By imposing such a threshold, the law judges that designs that
cannot meet some standard of cleverness or novelty are unlikely to
generate sufficient social benefits to justify the costs associated with IP
protection.62 This is a type of doctrinal screen. Costly screens, on the
other hand, force applicants to choose whether or not to pursue a
certain type of design right.63 That is, whether or not an applicant could
qualify for a right doctrinally, she must determine whether or not the
costs of obtaining and keeping the right are worth it to her.64

59. Id. at 713.
60. Id. at 692.
61. Cf. MATTHEW ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 32 (2006) (describing the object of social planners as maximizing benefits net of costs).
62. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1578 (2003) (explaining patent law’s utilitarian framework and the ways in which IP laws are
calibrated to generate net social benefits).
63. Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 12, at 688.
64. Id. at 688–90.
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B. Private Value, Social Value, and Screens
The law’s goal in applying either sort of screen is to align private
incentives with social value. We can think of design rights as falling into
one of four categories based on the relationship between private and
social value.65 First, consider the private value of the right—the value
of the right to its owner. IP rights can have “low” private value,
meaning that putative owners will not be able to generate significant
income from the ownership of the right. Or they can have “high”
private value, meaning that putative owners will be able to generate
significant income from the ownership of the right. This income could
arise through making products covered by the right, licensing the right
to others, or litigation over the right.
Second, consider the social value of the right plus the underlying
design—whether the underlying design, with an IP right attached to it,
produces net costs or net benefits for society. These rights (plus their
accompanying designs) can have positive social value or negative social
value. The IP right by itself creates only social costs: it makes it more
difficult and expensive for consumers or other designers to make use
of the design. However, the underlying design might create significant
social value: it might be creative or attractive, and consumers might be
willing to pay significant amounts of money to use it. Consequently, the
IP right (coupled with the associated design) might have positive social
value (if the design is worthwhile and valued by the public) or negative
social value (if the design is largely worthless) on the whole.
Thus, there are four categories of rights: (1) high private
value/positive social value rights; (2) high private value/negative social
value rights; (3) low private value/positive social value rights; and (4)
low private value/negative social value rights.

65. This two-by-two categorization was initially laid out in Fagundes & Masur, supra note
12, and Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 12. In those earlier works, the authors referred to “low
social value” and “high social value” rights. Here, for greater clarity, we describe them as
“negative social value” and “positive social value” rights. The categorization is identical; only the
nomenclature has changed slightly.
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Table 1: Four Possible Types of IP Rights

Private value

Social value
1. High private
value/Positive social
value
3. Low private
value/Positive social
value

2. High private
value/Negative social
value
4. Low private
value/Negative social
value

Doctrinal screens are meant to separate rights based upon social
value. They should prohibit the creation of IP rights that are predicted
to have negative net social value. That is, a well-calibrated doctrinal
screen is meant to draw a vertical line between the positive social value
rights in boxes 1 and 3 from the negative social value rights in boxes 2
and 4, permitting the former and blocking the latter.
Table 2: Idealized Doctrinal Screen

Private value

Social value
1. High private
value/Positive social
value

2. High private
value/Negative
social value

3. Low private
value/Positive social
value

4. Low private
value/Negative
social value

Consider, for instance, the requirement that utility and design
patents must be new and nonobvious. The purpose of patents is to
create incentives for new and valuable innovation. Absent new
innovation, patents are unlikely to create positive social value. Without
any new innovation, there is just an IP right, which creates costs for
consumers and subsequent inventors. Accordingly, the novelty and
nonobviousness requirements are meant to screen out those patent
applications that did not involve any socially valuable innovation
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and—if they were granted—would likely generate net social harm.66
Other doctrinal tests, such as the utility requirement for utility patents
and the idea/expression distinction in copyright law, perform similar
functions.67
Of course, even well-calibrated doctrinal screens will not function
perfectly. Requirements such as novelty and nonobviousness are only
proxies for positive social value. For instance, imagine a design patent
application involving a new and nonobvious design, but one that the
designer would have created whether or not she was able to obtain a
patent.68 A patent on this design would create negative social value,
because (a) the valuable design would exist regardless, and (b) the
patent will increase costs for consumers and subsequent designers.
Merely satisfying doctrinal IP requirements does not guarantee that
the IP right will create social value. IP doctrines are only proxies for
social value, and not always ideal ones. And of course not all doctrines
are properly calibrated, nor are they always properly applied. The
doctrine might be too lax or too stringent, and courts or the PTO may
err when evaluating whether a given right satisfies the doctrinal
requirements.
Thus, no IP doctrine actually succeeds in drawing a perfect vertical
line down the center of Table 1. Any system of doctrine will inevitably
permit some negative social value rights to see the light of day and
block some positive social value rights. Table 3 illustrates the
imperfections in doctrinal screens. Accordingly, even if doctrinal
screens are well-calibrated—and certainly if they are not—there is a
potential role for some other type of screen to play.

66. See Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
1217, 1244–46 (2017).
67. See infra notes 71–72, 81, 115 and accompanying text.
68. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability,
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1603–05 (2011).
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Table 3: Realistic Doctrinal Screen

Private value

Social value
1. High private
value/Positive social
value
3. Low private
value/Positive social
value

2. High private
value/Negative social
value
4. Low private
value/Negative social
value

Herein lies the motivation for costly screens. A costly screen is
simply a requirement that an applicant expend some amount of money
or undertake some costly activity to obtain, maintain, or enforce a
given legal right. The costly screen can take the form of an application
fee, a maintenance fee, or even a procedural hurdle that the IP owner
must overcome that will cost time or money to clear. Costly screens
may also arise because compliance with some aspect of the law is
expensive, such as the need to hire a lawyer to prosecute a patent.
Because it is the IP applicant or owner who must bear the expense,
costly screens affect IP rights differentially based upon their private
value. That is, a costly screen draws a horizontal line between the high
private value rights in boxes 1 and 2 and the low private value rights in
boxes 3 and 4. For high private value rights, costly screens are
irrelevant. If the rights are highly valuable to their potential owner, the
owner will invest the money to obtain them regardless of the cost.69 But
if the rights have low value to their owners, the costly screen will deter
the putative owner from obtaining the right in the first place.

69. Fagundes & Masur, supra note 12, at 692.
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Table 4: Idealized Costly Screen

Private value

Social value
1. High private
value/Positive social
value
3. Low private
value/Positive social
value

2. High private
value/Negative
social value
4. Low private
value/Negative
social value

Costly screens are a second-best solution because they will not
eliminate IP rights that fall into box 2, namely rights that have high
private value (so creators will pay to obtain them) but negative social
value.70 For example, if someone could claim the exclusive right to
publish stories about star-crossed lovers, she would be able to obtain
substantial private value from doing so, but it would clearly make
society worse off to allow a single author to exclude others from writing
novels with that storyline. No costly screen would prevent a creator
from applying for a copyright or patent on such a valuable idea. A
doctrinal screen is necessary. For this reason, copyright law’s
idea/expression doctrine71 prevents people from obtaining such rights.
No matter how much people would be willing to pay to obtain a
copyright over an idea or a utility patent over a product of nature, a
doctrinal screen prevents them from doing so.72
Instead, the function of a costly screen is to eliminate or curtail the
number of low private value IP rights. If the costly screen exceeds the
value of the right to its putative owner, the owner will not seek (or
maintain or enforce) the IP right. Of course, the private value of the
right is not what policymakers really care about—their focus is the

70. Costly screens are also regressive—they tax the least valuable IP the most. That might
be a feature, not a bug, in many cases, though, because the ones that are taxed the most in
percentage terms are the ones that are the least valuable.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.”).
72. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (establishing patentable subject matter doctrine); see generally
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013) (barring patents on
products of nature); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (same).
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social value of the right.73 Costly screens will reduce the number of low
private value/negative social value rights (box 4), which is good, but
they will also reduce the number of low private value/positive social
value rights (box 3), which is bad.74 Accordingly, costly screens are
appropriate when the number of potential low private value/negative
social value rights (box 4) is high and the number of potential low
private value/positive social value rights (box 3) is low, and they are
counterproductive when the reverse is true.75 Table 5 displays the
simultaneous operation of doctrinal and costly screens.
Table 5: Doctrinal and Costly Screens in Combination

Private value

Social value
1. High private
value/Positive social
value
3. Low private
value/Positive social
value

2. High private
value/Negative
social value
4. Low private
value/Negative
social value

Doctrinal screens and costly screens can and do exist side-by-side
in a wide variety of legal regimes.76 At the boundary between
copyrights, design patents, and utility patents, doctrinal screens and
costly screens play important complementary roles. Doctrinal screens
sort designs between the copyright, design patent, and utility patent
regimes, determining which will qualify for each category. And then
within those three doctrinal regimes, costly screens (or their absence)
determine the types of rights that creators will seek to obtain. For the
system to function properly, the two types of screens must be wellcalibrated to perform these operations in tandem.

73. Fagundes & Masur, supra note 12, at 695–97.
74. Id. at 695–98.
75. Id. at 703–07 (describing the general point in the context of copyright and patent law).
76. Doctrinal screens can also create costly screens. For example, trade dress law’s
requirement that a claimant must establish that the design has secondary meaning as a designation
of source will typically involve the expenditure of substantial resources on advertising. See infra
note 229 and accompanying text.
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C. Doctrinal Screens and the Selection of IP Regimes
Now that we have laid out the principles behind doctrinal and
costly screens, we turn our attention to the IP doctrines through which
these screens are meant to operate.
1. The Utility Patent Baseline. Because our focus is functionality,
our baseline is the utility patent regime. Utility patents were designed
to protect functional inventions, and indeed they can only be used to
protect functional inventions.77 Before an inventor can obtain a utility
patent, however, she must surmount a series of doctrinal and costly
screens that are implemented (directly or indirectly) through
examination by the PTO. The inventor must demonstrate to the PTO
that her invention is within the realm of utility patent law,78 is new and
nonobvious,79 is sufficiently developed and disclosed,80 and that it has
useful applications.81 In addition, the high cost of obtaining a utility
patent functions as a costly screen that eliminates a significant number
of low private value rights.82 The PTO’s examination of patents is not
always rigorous or effective, and the costly screen imposed is not
terribly high relative to the private value of the most significant
patents.83 Nonetheless, utility patent law couples the IP regime that is
most protective of functionality with the most stringent doctrinal and
costly barriers to entry. In the sections that follow, we compare
copyright law and design patent law against this baseline. We explore
the extent to which they can be used to obtain “backdoor” protection
for functional elements and the legal responses to the possibility of
77. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Authorship Screen, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1603,
1613–15 (2018).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (listing patentable subject matters).
79. Id. § 102(a) (novel); id. § 103 (nonobvious).
80. Id. § 112 (requiring that the invention be described and enabled).
81. Id.
82. Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 12, at 701.
83. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 130–33
(2004); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1559, 1567 (2006) (“Fee diversion has impoverished the PTO, making it difficult for the Office to
search or examine prior art comprehensively.”); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman,
Does Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting
Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67, 88 (2013) (arguing that the PTO grants too many patents in order
to earn maintenance fees); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U.
L. REV. 1495, 1508–11 (2001); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 53 (2007); Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 12, at
701; Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest
for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2062–63 (2009).
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such protection.
2. Copyright Law. On its face, copyright law would appear to be
the most favorable place for creators to turn in search of backdoor
utility patents. Copyright law imposes the lowest creativity threshold
for protection, and, once granted, copyright protection lasts the
longest. To prevent this sort of doctrinal arbitrage, copyright is meant
to have the strictest set of functionality screens, traditionally limiting
its availability only to works with no, or very modest amounts of,
functionality.
Obtaining a copyright is incredibly easy. Federal copyright
protection exists from the moment that a work is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression.84 Creators need not demonstrate any
substantial cleverness to obtain copyright protection.85 A work is
protectable if it is original, which means that it was not copied from
another source and that it evinces some creativity that is just a bit more
than entirely trivial.86 So while the Supreme Court rejected a copyright
claim for a telephone white pages directory because it was
insufficiently original and creative,87 courts have upheld protection for
yellow pages directories,88 fairly simple photographs,89 and three-note
sequences of music.90 Copyright law sets the creativity hurdle
incredibly low, enabling virtually any work with a spark of cleverness
or novelty to sail over.91
Copyright protection is also cheap. Authors don’t need to pay any
money or file any paperwork to obtain copyright protection.92 Every
reader of this article has created at least one and probably several
84. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487–88 (2004).
85. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title,
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”).
87. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361–63.
88. See Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.
1991).
89. See Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2009); Mannion v. Coors
Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). But see Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225
F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000).
90. See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2014) (assuming without deciding
that a three-note sequence of a musical composition could have evinced sufficient originality to
be copyrightable).
91. Buccafusco, Burns, Fromer & Sprigman, supra note 53; Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting
Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 464, 488–89 (2009).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2012) (noting that “registration is not a condition of copyright
protection”).
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copyrights today, just by living an ordinary life. Creators need not
register their works with the Copyright Office, although they may do
so for a nominal fee,93 and the Office will generally grant registration
without meaningful examination of the claimed work.94 If they do want
the additional benefits of copyright registration, creators can pay $40
and fill out a very simple form online,95 no lawyers or bankers required.
For this nominal sum, they get quite a bit. Copyright protection isn’t
just easy to obtain; it also lasts for a really long time. Most copyrights
last for about a century or more.96
Copyright law offers creators a regime with a trivial creativity bar
and incredibly long protection, and one that does not require
meaningful examination. Creators who cannot meet utility patent law’s
strict utility and nonobviousness requirements or who desire longer
protection are often tempted to seek copyright protection instead. To
combat this behavior, Congress erected strict functionality screens to
prevent misuse.97 In some cases, copyright law simply denies protection
to entire categories of works because they are deemed too functional.98
However expressive cooking or yoga might be, creators cannot rely on
copyright law for protection in these fields.99 In other cases, such as
93. Id. § 408 (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . may obtain registration of the copyright claim
by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, together with the
application and fee specified by sections 409 and 708. Such registration is not a condition of
copyright protection.”).
94. See Thomas G. Field, Jr., Judicial Review of Copyright Examination, 44 IDEA 479, 482
(2004).
95. See Fees, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/about/fees.html
[https://perma.cc/82TZ-S9RG]; Registration Portal, U.S COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.
copyright.gov/registration [https://perma.cc/ZK23-LYR7].
96. 17 U.S.C. § 302. For many works, copyrights last for the life of the author plus an
additional seventy years postmortem. Id. For other works, including works made for hire or works
created before 1978, copyright typically lasts for ninety-five years from the date of first
publication. Id.
97. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1303; Samuelson, supra note 48, at 1497.
98. Buccafusco and Lemley refer to this as an “Exclusion Screen.” Buccafusco & Lemley,
supra note 1.
99. Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2015)
(denying copyright protection to a series of yoga poses); Lorenzana v. S. Am. Rests. Corp., 799
F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2015) (denying copyright protection to chicken sandwich); Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v.
Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying copyright protection to constituent
recipes in a cookbook protected by a compilation copyright). For scholarships commenting on
this topic, see Christopher Buccafusco, Authorship and the Boundaries of Copyright: Ideas,
Expressions, and Functions in Yoga, Choreography, and Other Works, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
421 (2016); Christopher Buccafusco, Making Sense of Intellectual Property Law, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 501 (2012); Christopher Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas
Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121 (2007).
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computer software, copyright law allows limited protection for the
relatively few expressive aspects of such works while also filtering out
any of their functional content from protection.100 Copyright
protection, if it exists for a computer program, should not cover any of
its aspects that relate to efficiency or compatibility, leaving those free
for others to copy and use.101 Most important for design, however, is
the regime that Congress created for handling pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works. Congress was concerned that industrial designers
would attempt to use copyright law to gain exclusive rights over the
designs of “useful articles” such as clothing, furniture, or appliances.102
Because these items are intrinsically functional, easily obtainable
exclusive rights could impose substantial and unwarranted costs on the
public and subsequent creators.103 To avert this risk, the Copyright Act
imposes additional eligibility criteria on useful articles.104 Such works
are copyrightable only if and only to the extent that they contain
“pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article.”105
The useful articles doctrine was intended to exclude from
copyright protection works of industrial design, including designs that
successfully marry form and function.106 The artistic yet simultaneously
functional design of a chair leg, automobile hood, smartphone, or
garment were unprotectable via copyright.107 Protection could extend
only to purely nonfunctional features of useful articles such as a hood

100. Comput. Assoc’s. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–10 (2d Cir. 1992) (creating a test
to filter out the functional elements of computer software); see Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API
Copyright Dead: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection of Network and Functional
Features of Computer Software, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 305, 328 (2018) (analyzing the Altai
abstraction-filtration-comparison test); Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in
Computer Programs: Refining the Tests of Software Copyright Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1215, 1220 (2016) (same).
101. See, e.g., Altai, 982 F.2d at 708–09. But see Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (extending protection to the functional aspects of a computer program’s
interface component).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”).
103. See Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Fashion’s Function in Intellectual
Property Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 52 (2017).
104. Id.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
106. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 49–50, 54–55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5662–63,
5667–68.
107. Id.
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ornament or printed decal. That is, copyright would only attach to
features of a work that existed solely to portray its appearance or
convey information.108
For example, the Second Circuit denied the designer of the
“Ribbon Rack” bicycle rack copyright protection even though the
work was aesthetically appealing and had won numerous design
awards.109 The aspects of the design that were expressive, such as the
shape of its curves, were also intrinsically related to its functionality.
By contrast, the same court upheld copyrights in decorative belt
buckles, because the buckles’ shape did not affect their utility and was
entirely superimposed on the functional aspects of the designs.110 Thus,
copyright law’s useful articles doctrine allowed creators to obtain
protection for solely nonfunctional aspects of their designs, but it
rejected claims based on design elements that intermixed functional
and nonfunctional components.111
Beyond the useful articles doctrine, copyright law also includes a
variety of other features meant to balance its power and scope. On one
hand, copyright law offers reasonably broad protection against
competition. Copyright owners can prevent not only literal or exact
duplications of their designs but also those that are substantially similar
to them.112 This can include works that have the same “aesthetic
appeal” as the copyrighted work.113 On the other hand, copyright law
limits this otherwise broad scope in a number of ways. First, copyright
only prohibits actual copying: a designer sued for infringement can
defend herself by proving that she independently created the allegedly
infringing design, even if the prior and subsequent designs are
identical.114 Second, copyright law narrows the scope of an author’s
copyright to her expression of a particular idea, rather than to the idea
itself. For example, the designer of a jeweled pin the shape of a bee
108. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “useful article”); see also Buccafusco & Fromer, supra note 103.
109. See generally Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987)
(considering the functionality of an artistic bicycle rack).
110. See generally Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
111. That law has recently changed in significant respects as a result of the Supreme Court’s
Star Athletica decision. We discuss that decision in Part III.A.
112. See, e.g., Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2001).
113. Id. But see Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (limiting plaintiff’s copyright
in jellyfish-in-glass sculpture to “thin protection” against only virtually identical copying).
114. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“[J]ust as he is
no less an ‘author’ because others have preceded him, so another who follows him, is not a tortfeasor unless he pirates his work.”). On the independent creation doctrine in copyright law, see
generally ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? (2015).
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cannot prevent everyone else from producing bee-shaped jewelry.115
Third, copyright law’s fair use doctrine permits certain kinds of copying
that are deemed socially valuable or that don’t interfere with the
copyright owner’s market exploitation.116 Although comment and
criticism are the paradigmatic examples of fair use, it can also include
instances of copying that are motivated by the need to access functional
features of a work.117 Finally, copyright law limits the damages that a
victorious copyright holder can receive. Copyright apportions damages
for infringing and noninfringing elements.118 That is, even if a design is
held to infringe an existing copyright, the copyright owner can only
recover damages based on the proportion of lost royalties attributable
to the copying.119 She cannot recover royalties attributable to other,
noncopyrighted elements of the infringing product.120
Thus, at least since the 1976 Copyright Act (“1976 Act”),
copyright law has coupled an incredibly low creativity screen, a low
cost of acquisition, and a long term of protection with a rather robust
functionality screen and a number of doctrines that limit the right’s
power. Although purely nonfunctional works could obtain protection
with ease, functional works were meant to be excluded from the
regime. In particular, creators of industrial designs were meant to be
channeled into the design patent or utility patent regimes instead of
copyright.
3. Design Patents. For creators seeking IP protection over
ornamental designs, design patent law offers the primary alternative to
115. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741–42 (9th Cir. 1971).
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . , for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.”). For a discussion of the market effect of fair use, see Jeanne C.
Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L.
REV. 1251 (2014).
117. Sony Comput. Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that copying to access unprotected functional elements constitutes fair use); Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992) (same).
118. See generally Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co.,
886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989); Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545
(9th Cir. 1989).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
120. See generally Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940). This does
not mean that copyright’s damages provisions are a model of policymaking. See Pamela
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of
Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009). Statutory damages are indeed subject to abuse in
copyright law. But the problem occurs primarily when one defendant is accused of multiple small
acts of infringement. That is unlikely to be true in the design cases we consider here.
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copyright.121 Design patents protect the ornamental features of a
utilitarian article of manufacture.122 While design patent law’s
ornamentality requirement has been treated as a functionality bar, it
has been applied in a far more relaxed manner than copyright law’s
useful articles doctrine.123 Thus, in contrast to copyright law, where
functionality is supposed to be rigorously policed, design patent
doctrine is more tolerant of claims that mix ornamentality with
utility.124 Design elements are eligible for protection whenever there
are other alternatives to the claimed element.125 Because there is often
at least one other way of achieving a function—even if it isn’t quite as
good—design patents often include substantial functionality that is
mixed with ornamentality.
Both the PTO—which reviews design patent applications—and
the federal courts have enabled creators to include functional elements
within the scope of their design patents. Claimants have been allowed
to protect design features that do more than merely portray
appearances or convey information but also contribute to how the
design works and have substantial functional value. So although design
patent claims should be “construed in order to identify the nonfunctional aspects of the design,”126 what counts as “non-functional” in
the design patent context is broader than it has been in copyright law.
The Federal Circuit has consistently permitted design patents that
cover functional elements that contribute to a product’s usefulness or
efficiency. Consider, for example, the shoe design at issue in L.A. Gear,
Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co.127 Although each element of the
plaintiff’s shoe design contributed to the shoe’s function, the court
121. Congress has considered a number of other design protection regimes in the last hundred
years. See Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful
Articles, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 339 (1990). Congress has even adopted a separate design
protection regime for vessel hulls. 17 U.S.C. § 1301.
122. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012) (design is “for a[] [utilitarian] article of manufacture”).
123. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach
to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 707–08 (1982) (“Design patents long offered
the possibility of protection for the ornamental design of a useful product.”).
124. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1. Indeed, Charles Colman has argued that
ornamentality was viewed as a negative thing by the courts for much of the history of design
patent law. Charles E. Colman, Design and Deviance: Patent as Symbol, Rhetoric as Metric: Part
2, 56 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (2015). If so, that may have pushed designers to seek protection for the
functional aspects of their products.
125. Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Functionality in Design Protection Systems, 19 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 261, 281–85 (2012).
126. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
127. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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upheld the plaintiff’s design patent because the overall design of the
shoe was not “dictated by the use or purpose of the article.”128 That is,
although these elements served a utilitarian purpose, they were still
protectable because competitors could achieve the same purpose with
different designs.129 Even though the design elements served a
utilitarian function and even though they may have been the best way
to achieve that function, they were still included within the scope of the
plaintiff’s claim.130
In perhaps the Federal Circuit’s most comprehensive discussion of
functionality screening, the court in Richardson v. Stanley Works,
Inc.131 explained that design patents would only be declared invalid if
“the patented design is primarily functional rather than
ornamental.”132 Thus, many designs that were substantially functional
but not primarily so would be upheld.133 The court upheld the plaintiff’s
patent covering the “ornamental” design of a multifunction tool, which
in this case included the shape of the tool’s edges and corners.134 But
whatever “ornamental” meant here, it certainly didn’t mean entirely
nonfunctional. The shape of a hand tool’s corners and edges will
contribute significantly to its comfort, manipulability, and durability.
These are aspects of the design that copyright law’s useful article
doctrine would traditionally have screened out for being
simultaneously aesthetic and functional.135
128. Id. at 1123.
129. Id. In Europe, by contrast, the availability of alternative designs does not foreclose a
finding of functionality. Judgment of 8 March 2018, DOCERAM GmbH v. CeramTec GmbH, C395/16, EU:C:2018:172, paragraph 32. For a discussion of that case, see Jens Schovsbo & Graeme
B. Dinwoodie, Design Protection for Products That Are “Dictated by Function,” in THE EU
DESIGN APPROACH: A GLOBAL APPRAISAL (Annette Kur, Marianne Levin & Jens Schovsbo
eds., Edward Elgar Publishing forthcoming Nov. 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3164916
[https://perma.cc/ZD49-A5M6].
130. See Perry J. Saidman, Functionality and Design Patent Validity and Infringement, 91 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 313, 317 (2009) (“[I]f the individual de facto functional features
of an article . . . claimed in a design patent were removed from consideration prior to applying the
ordinary observer infringement test, there would in most cases be nothing left of the patented
design to compare to the accused design.”).
131. Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
132. Id. at 1293–94.
133. The court “factored out” functional elements of a multi-function tool design from the
scope of the plaintiff’s claim when it came to deciding infringement. These elements included the
handle, the hammer-head, and the jaw, because they were “driven purely by utility.” Id. at 1294.
134. Id. at 1296.
135. European design law similarly allows for the protection of functional elements that are
coupled with aesthetic or ornamental elements. See Judgment of 8 March 2018, DOCERAM
GmbH v. CeramTec GmbH, C-395/16, EU:C:2018:172, paragraph 32.
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In Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Corp.,136 the Federal Circuit
upheld the validity and infringement of the rounded corners of the
iPhone design, even while acknowledging that they improved
“pocketability” and “durability.”137 This decision is even more startling
in light of that the fact that, earlier in the same opinion, the court
rejected Apple’s claim to trade dress on the same features on the
grounds that they were functional.138 By including functional features,
the court noted, Apple “pursued both ‘beauty’ and functionality.”139
Nonetheless, the court still permitted Apple to draw upon design
patents for IP protection. While copyright (at least until recently)
excluded an item from protection if there was no way to separate its
nonfunctional and functional aspects, design patent law welcomes
designs that intertwine form and function. The only designs or
elements that will be excluded from design patent’s functionality
screen are those that are purely utilitarian.140
Design patents differ from copyrights along a number of other
dimensions related to their scope and strength. For example, design
patents have a narrower scope than copyrights.141 Variations from a
design that copyright law would treat as substantially similar and thus
infringing, design patent law treats as sufficiently different and
noninfringing.142 In other ways, however, design patents are more
powerful rights than copyrights. There is no independent invention
defense to design patents: if a subsequent design infringes an existing
design patent, it is irrelevant whether or not the designer copied the
preexisting design.143 Furthermore, design patent law does not include

136. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
137. Id. at 993.
138. Id. at 993–95.
139. Id. at 995.
140. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1350.
141. See, e.g., Dennis David Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights 4
(Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2010-17, 2010), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1656590 [https://perma.cc/UKD8-YZUF]. In general, design patents do not enable
claimants to protect downstream “derivatives” of their designs. See, e.g., Egyptian Goddess, Inc.
v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (establishing the ordinary observer test for design
patent infringement).
142. For instance, Apple’s iPad patent on the rectangle with rounded corners was found valid
but not infringed by Samsung’s virtually indistinguishable design. Apple, 786 F.3d at 983. Both
aspects of that ruling are surprising. The Federal Circuit has clarified that the same test must be
used to establish infringement by the defendant as was used to establish validity for the plaintiff.
Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 677–78.
143. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
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any defense akin to copyright law’s fair use provision.144 Finally, when
assessing damages for design patent infringement, judges do not
apportion the value of damages between infringing and noninfringing
elements. Infringers are on the hook for all of the profits they gain
because of the infringement, without respect to the proportion of those
profits that were driven by noninfringing elements.145
As we discussed above, granting creators exclusive rights over
partially functional features, as design patent law does, can provide
them with substantial market power. The lack of independent
invention or fair use doctrines and the absence of damages
apportionment heighten this power. This can create costs for
consumers, who must pay more for goods with patented designs, and
for subsequent creators, who must license existing designs or expend
resources in designing around them.
In exchange, to lessen the risks to consumers and other creators,
Congress made it more costly and more difficult to obtain protection
through design patent law than through copyright law. To obtain a
design patent, a creator must submit a formal application to the PTO
that depicts the claimed design.146 At the PTO, the claimed design
undergoes examination to determine whether it should be granted or
not.147 Unlike in copyright law, where the work need only be original
and minimally creative to receive protection, the design patent statute
requires that the claimed design be both novel and nonobvious, in
parallel with the requirements for utility patents.148 Novelty here means
newness.149 If the design or a substantially similar one previously
existed, the applicant can’t obtain a patent.150 In addition, if a designer
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.”).
144. See generally Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (arguing for the adoption of a fair use defense in patent law);
Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011) (same).
145. Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 30, at 117 (“A design patent carries with it the
potential for enormous monetary awards, even if it claims only a tiny, trivial, or otherwise
insignificant part of a product’s overall design.”). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016), may moderate that somewhat. See
infra note 289 and accompanying text.
146. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 601 (8th ed., rev. 8, July 2010).
147. Id. §§ 601–03.
148. 17 U.S.C. § 171 (2012); see Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the
Origins of the Design Patent Standard, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 531 (2009).
149. Sarah Burstein, Visual Invention, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 169, 175 (2012).
150. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1237–41 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to modify prior designs
to create the claimed design, the applicant can’t obtain a patent.151 As
with utility patents, these requirements are intended to pose a
substantial hurdle for claimants. Only those who have produced a
significant innovation in ornamental design should be given exclusive
rights to reproduce and sell it.
In addition, design patents receive substantially shorter protection
than do copyrights. Design patents only last for fifteen years from the
date of grant, less than one-sixth the duration of a copyright.152
***
The doctrinal screens that set the boundaries between copyright,
design patents, and utility patents thus endeavor collectively to channel
functional and ornamental elements into the proper IP regimes. The
law’s object is to prevent creators from obtaining rights that would
produce negative social value. By combining creativity thresholds with
functionality limitations, IP law strives to maximize social welfare by
giving creators the correct set of rights. Utility patents are the most
natural home for functional inventions, but they also involve the most
exacting legal standards. Design patents offer some protection for
functional elements, but they similarly require application and
examination by the PTO to determine whether the design meets
certain legal benchmarks. This means that if designers will get the
benefits of protection for functionality, they will have to show that they
contributed a significant new design. Copyrights, by contrast, are easily
obtained and last for a long time, but they generally cannot be used to
protect functional elements. They are also leavened with other legal
defenses that mitigate the ability of designers to leverage them into
market share over functional products.
D. Costly Screens within IP
The legal doctrines governing copyright and design patent law are
meant to channel designs with functional elements toward design
patents and away from copyright. But this between-regimes doctrinal
screen is not the only relevant barrier to obtaining IP rights. In
addition, design patent law imposes a costly screen, while copyright law
151. Id. at 1240; Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
152. Burstein, supra note 16, at 172.
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does not. Copyrights spring into being instantly and almost costlessly.153
This is appropriate, at least in theory. Because copyrights are not
thought to protect functional elements, they cannot usually provide
substantial market power to designers.154 The independent creation
doctrine, as well as the suite of other doctrines that characterize
copyright law, similarly limit the power of a copyright.155 Copyright
law’s functionality screen should thus prevent the existence of high
private value/negative social value rights. In addition, there should be
relatively few low private value/negative social value copyrights,
though potentially some low private value/positive social value ones.156
These are the conditions under which a costly screen would normally
do more harm than good, and thus it seems appropriate that copyright
law does not establish one.157
With respect to design patents, the opposite is true. Applicants
seeking design patents must first apply to the PTO and have their
patent applications examined. Design patent’s doctrinal screen—new
and nonobvious—is applied ex ante, through this process of application
and examination, rather than only ex post through judicial review.158
The ex ante review imposes costs through delay—the applicant can
only make use of the patent once the examination is complete. It also
creates financial costs for the applicant. The PTO charges fees of $180
to apply for a design patent,159 $120 to cover the search for prior art,160
$460 to have the patent examined,161 and $560 for the patent to be
issued,162 for a total upfront cost of $1320. Most applicants also hire
professionals to produce the drawings for the applications, which costs
153. While copyright protection is automatic, there are certain advantages to copyright
registration. But unlike filing an application with the PTO for a design or utility patent, copyright
registration is very cheap (between $35 and $55) and can be done with a simple web form without
hiring a lawyer. Circular 4: Copyright Office Fees, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https://www.
copyright.gov/circs/circ04.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y5Z-FMXE] (last updated Apr. 2018). And the
examination process is cursory. Indeed, in many circuits it is the mere filing of the copyright
application that confers benefits, even if it is later rejected. Kenneth Moskow, What’s in a Word?
Defining Registration Under the Copyright Act, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 87 (2011).
154. Fagundes & Masur, supra note 12, at 712–13.
155. Id. at 713; see also supra Part II.C.2.
156. Id. at 704–07.
157. Id.
158. See Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 30, at 137 (describing the design patent
examination process).
159. 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(b) (2012).
160. 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(l).
161. 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(p).
162. 37 C.F.R. § 1.18(b).
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approximately $500,163 and attorneys or agents to represent them, at a
cost of approximately $2000 on average.164 All told, a design patent
applicant will spend approximately $5000 to obtain a valid patent,165
compared with as little as $40 spent by a copyright applicant.166
These upfront fees are potentially important. Design patent rights
can be powerful: as we explained above, not only can design patents be
used to protect functional elements, but they are also not limited by
independent creation or fair use defenses, and victorious design patent
plaintiffs can recover significant damages.167 This has two significant
ramifications for the universe of potential design patents. First, it
reduces the likelihood of low private value/positive social value design
patents, just as there are very few low private value/positive social
value utility patents.168 Design patent rights are strong enough within
their scope to allow their owners to capture a substantial proportion of
the value of any designs they have created.169
Second, despite the operation of doctrinal screens, the power of
design patents raises the prospect of numerous low private
value/negative social value design patents. Each existing design patent
increases costs for future designers in ways that copyrights do not. A
new designer who wishes to patent a design must comb through the
thicket of existing designs to determine whether someone has already
patented a similar design.170 This is because there is no independent
creation defense to design patent infringement. Even if the second
designer has no knowledge of the patented design, she may still be held

163. Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 30, at 124; Thomas T. Chan, Design Patent, in THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S LEGAL GUIDE TO FASHION DESIGN 38 (David H. Faux ed.,
2013).
164. Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 30, at 124 (citing AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N,
2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-100 (2015)).
165. Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 30, at 124.
166. Copyright registration costs only $40, and is so simple that you don’t need a lawyer to do
it. If you do hire a lawyer the total cost could rise to roughly $400, AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N,
supra note 164, at I-100, but that is still well less than the cost of a design patent.
167. See supra Part II.C.3.
168. See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 12, at 706–08 (explaining why low private
value/positive social value patents are unlikely to exist in large numbers).
169. Burstein, supra note 16, at 182 (describing how design patent holders can effectively use
design patents in the marketplace).
170. See Sarah Burstein, Moving Beyond the Standard Criticisms of Design Patents, 17 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 305, 316–18 (2013) (explaining the process by which designers attempt to
determine whether new designs are patentable or whether they can be employed without violating
another’s patent).
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liable for infringement.171 By contrast, an author seeking to protect a
design through copyright need not prove that her design is novel, need
not worry about infringing a preexisting design (so long as she did not
copy it), and thus need not search the existing stock of copyrighted
designs before proceeding.172 Each newly granted design patent
imposes a small social cost by contributing to the mass of existing
designs that a new designer must navigate.173
In addition, because there is no independent creation defense,
even weak design patents can be used to file nuisance lawsuits and
extract settlements. Potential damages from design patent
infringement are so high that many defendants will settle rather than
challenge patents that appear to be invalid or not infringed.174 This
gives rise to the possibility that owners of design patents that are likely
invalid or not infringed might nonetheless be able to extract small
payments from lawsuit targets without having to litigate those patents
to final judgment.175 As in the utility patent context, these types of
lawsuits create negative social value. They impose a tax on other
designers without leading to the contribution of valuable new
designs.176
Design patent law’s novelty and nonobviousness rules are meant
to deter negative social value rights by preventing creators from
obtaining patents when they haven’t contributed truly new designs. But
these doctrinal rules are imperfect proxies for social value. Many
designs that are new and nonobvious are undesirable nonetheless. A
designer may create a unique shape for a shoe that turns out to be both
uncomfortable and unattractive. If the patented design turns out not to
be socially useful, then the patent has net negative social value. It
represents an additional IP right that future designers will be forced to
search through when attempting to determine whether an existing right
covers their intended designs.177 A doctrinal screen will not have

171. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (imposing no scienter requirement).
172. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
173. See Burstein, supra note 170, at 320 (describing the search process).
174. Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 30, at 131.
175. For discussion of the prospect of design patent trolls, see Tim Sparapani, Stretched Too
Far: Convoluted Design Patent Rules Empower Patent Trolls, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/timsparapani/2015/12/03/stretched-too-far-convoluted-design-patent-rulesempower-patent-trolls [https://perma.cc/7CDZ-W2RZ].
176. Cf. Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 12, at 715.
177. Cf. Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 187,
191–92 (2011).
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eliminated it.
These considerations indicate that the design patent regime stands
to benefit from application of a costly screen. Recall that a costly screen
will only affect the issuance of low private value patents.178 Designers
will still seek high private value patents regardless of any screen—it
will just be more expensive for them to do so. There are very few low
private value/positive social value patents, so a costly screen will not
negatively affect any such grants (or the underlying designs). At the
same time, a costly screen might deter the filing of many low private
value/negative social value design patents. If it simply reduces the
number of low-value design patents that are filed and must later be
navigated, that is a social gain; if it similarly reduces the number of
nuisance-value suits that are filed, that would be a benefit as well.
The upshot is that if the IP system were operating properly,
doctrinal and costly screens would combine to select for predominantly
social welfare-enhancing patents. Copyright’s high functionality screen
would channel any design covering a functional element toward design
patents. There, design patent’s high creativity screen would ensure that
only truly innovative designs were rewarded with patent protection,
and the costly screen would eliminate many (though surely not all) of
the weak, negative social value patents that might otherwise be
granted. Designers who opted out of the high design patent screens and
into copyright protection would receive only a much thinner right that
would create many fewer social costs.179 The problem, as the next Part
will demonstrate, is that the doctrinal and costly screens within
copyright and design patent law are not functioning in this manner.
III. THE BREAKDOWN OF FUNCTIONALITY SCREENING
Channeling functional designs via a combination of doctrinal and
costly screens would be a sound approach if those screens were
operating properly. Ideally, the system should mitigate the risk of
negative social value IP rights by making it difficult and costly for
claimants to obtain protection for functional creations and the market
power that goes with them. Unfortunately, however, the institutions
that govern IP law have failed to implement its doctrinal and costly
screens effectively. Copyright law’s high functionality screen for useful
articles has vanished, and design patent law’s creativity threshold and

178. See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text.
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costly examination screen are much weaker than is commonly
understood. Moreover, the problem is getting worse, not better, with
recent Supreme Court and Federal Circuit decisions that have
distorted the careful balance of screens upon which design law had
relied.
A. Star Athletica and the Lowering of Copyright Law’s Functionality
Bar
Under the system established by the 1976 Copyright Act,
copyright law, with its virtually nonexistent creativity threshold and
nearly costless screen, was meant to be the home for solely
nonfunctional designs, or at least the completely nonfunctional
elements of designs.180 The useful articles doctrine was meant to screen
out any utilitarian aspects of an article that were not capable of being
identified separately from—and could not exist independently of—the
article’s nonfunctional features. In its recent opinion in the case of Star
Athletica v. Varsity Brands, however, the Supreme Court tore down
copyright law’s high functionality bar and replaced it with one that
resembles design patent law.181
The case involved two-dimensional designs of stripes, chevrons,
and color-blocking that were incorporated into cheerleading uniforms.
The placement of these design features on the uniforms was partially
functional.182 Although the designs may have been visually appealing
in their own right, that’s not why they were chosen. They also served
to affect the appearance of the wearer’s body, emphasizing certain
body parts and deemphasizing others, and to identify the wearer as a
cheerleader.183 Unlike a decal of a team logo or mascot that could be
attached to the uniform for purely nonfunctional reasons, the designs
at issue in the case were dual nature—they were simultaneously
expressive and utilitarian.184 According to decades of appellate
opinions interpreting the 1976 Act’s useful articles doctrine, the
designs should have been categorically uncopyrightable.185
180. Buccafusco & Fromer, supra note 103, at 65; Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1, 1327–
28.
181. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
182. Buccafusco & Fromer, supra note 103, 89–90.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See generally Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, 500 F. App’x 42 (2d Cir. 2012);
Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005); Chosun Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha
Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 328 (2d Cir. 2005); Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costume Co., 891
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Justice Thomas’s opinion for the majority of the Court interpreted
the statute in a much more lenient fashion. According to the Court,
design elements could be copyrightable if they meet two criteria: (1)
that the decisionmaker can spot elements that appear to have pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural qualities, and (2) that the feature could exist in a
work once it is imagined apart from the useful article.186 The first step,
which the Court noted was “not onerous,” only seems to require the
decisionmaker to find something at least partially nonfunctional about
the design of the object, even if it is intertwined with functional
elements. The second step then asks whether those features could be
“imaginatively separated” and depicted or reproduced in some
nonuseful article. Because the stripes, chevrons, and color-blocking
“hav[e] pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities,”187 and because they
could have been depicted on a piece of paper or canvas,188 they met the
Court’s test for copyrightability.
While this might seem like a fairly straightforward reading of the
statute, the radical nature of Justice Thomas’s opinion lies in its
discussion of the imagining and separating that he has in mind. Justice
Thomas referred to the view that copyright law should only protect
solely artistic features as “flawed.”189 Instead, he announced that
copyright can extend to a design feature “even if it makes that article
more useful.”190 A feature can now count as a protectable pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural element even if it imparts significant utility to the
article—indeed, even if the article couldn’t function at all without it.191
Under this approach, copyright law can now protect things like
aerodynamic elements of a car that make it drive faster or with less
wind resistance, and perhaps even designs like a pattern of tire treads
that are intended for functional purposes but that could be imagined as
works of abstract art.
The Court’s opinion in Star Athletica thus fundamentally altered
the nature of copyright law’s functionality screen.192 Instead of refusing

F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir.1989) (citing Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir.
1940) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)).
186. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1009 (2017).
187. Id. at 1012.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1014.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1332. See generally Peter S. Menell & Daniel
Yablon, Star Athletica’s Fissure in the Intellectual Property Functionality Landscape, 166 U. PA.
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to protect dual nature features and channeling them to design patent
law, copyright law will now potentially be available to protect features
of applied art and industrial design that contribute to the article’s
function. The opinion replaces copyright law’s high doctrinal screen for
functionality with one that in fact resembles design patent law’s much
more accommodating standard—but, of course, while also retaining
copyright law’s low creativity threshold and costless examination and
registration.193
The design at issue in Star Athletica highlights the significance of
this combination of screens. Because the Court lowered copyright law’s
functionality bar, the cheerleading uniforms are not categorically
excluded from protection. Instead, they will only fail to obtain
protection if they cannot meet copyright law’s creativity threshold,
which requires only that they be original and more than minimally
creative. Accordingly, the designers of these cheerleading uniforms
will be able to obtain IP protection for functional aspects of their
creations without establishing that they have made a substantial
innovation and without surmounting any sort of costly screen.
For example, in the wake of Star Athletica, the Copyright Review
Board recently reversed a denial of registration for a lighting fixture
based on Star Athletica, and it found that a very simple crystal mesh
pattern was sufficiently original for copyright protection.194 Courts
have allowed protection for such things as a car floor liner made of tire
tread195 and a replica of the Statue of Liberty.196 Copyright’s previously
rigorous functionality screen now resembles design patent’s generous
and flexible functionality screen.197
L. REV. ONLINE 137 (2017).
193. See supra note 192 and accompanying text; see also Barton Beebe, Star Athletica and the
Problem of Panaestheticism, 9 IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1) (“[Star
Athletica] has destroyed the separability test in copyright law and rendered the statutory language
that supports it a nullity.”); Mark P. McKenna, Knowing Separability When We See It, 166 U. PA.
L. REV. ONLINE 127, 131 (2017) (describing Star Athletica’s muddied test for functionality).
194. See Letter from Regan A. Smith, Copyright Office Review Bd., U.S. Copyright Office,
to Shanna K. Sanders, Heslin Rothenberg Farley & Mesiti P.C. (July 27, 2017), https://www.
copyright.gov/rulings-filings/review-board/docs/amaca.pdf [https://perma.cc/73F7-R2DD].
195. David Kluft, Star Athletica and the Expansion of Useful Article Protection: Copyright
Office Permits Registration of Automotive Floor Liner, FOLEY HOAG L.L.P.: TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT L. BLOG (Apr. 24, 2018), http://www.trademarkandcopyrightlawblog.com/2018/04/
star-athletica-and-the-expansion-of-useful-article-protection-copyright-office-permitsregistration-of-automotive-floor-liner [https://perma.cc/GE7U-WN3W].
196. Davidson v. United States, No. 13-942C, 2017 WL 3033774 (Fed. Cl. July 18, 2017).
197. To be sure, as noted above copyright has other limitations designed to prevent backdoor
utility patents. Two of us have argued elsewhere that those limitations should now come into play
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B. The Failure of Design Patent’s Screens
In contrast to copyright law, design patent law is meant to couple
laxer rules on functionality with (1) a high doctrinal creativity screen
and (2) a significant costly screen. In reality, however, neither of these
screens is operating as intended. Consider first the doctrinal screen. At
least in theory, design patents should be subjected to substantial
scrutiny to ensure that they are novel and nonobvious. This is the
tradeoff that designers make in order to obtain the ability to protect
functional elements related to designs and the market power that
accompanies it. Designers should only be able to capture significant
market power if they have contributed a truly new and innovative
design.
The truth is that design patent law’s doctrinal screen is largely
toothless. The PTO rejects only 1.2 percent of designs for novelty or
obviousness.198 Moreover, it is not as if this high grant rate is being
driven by the fact that designers are playing it safe and only applying
for patents on designs that are clearly novel. Even a quick perusal of
some of the design patents granted by the PTO reveals that designers
are regularly able to obtain patents on designs that are so familiar they
should have never been granted.199
Design patent law’s creativity screen is failing for three distinct but
related reasons. First, neither the PTO nor the courts apply the novelty
and nonobviousness thresholds as rigorously in design patent law as
they do in utility patent law.200 For prior art to invalidate a design
patent for lacking novelty, the PTO and courts seem to require that the
two designs be nearly identical in every feature. They will only deem a
design patent obvious if there is a single “primary reference” that has
the same overall appearance as the claimed design which can be
coupled with a “secondary reference” that modifies the primary

to dramatically narrow the scope of any resulting right. See Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1,
at 1371–72; see generally Samuelson, supra note 48 (giving examples of different types of
functionality doctrines in copyright law). But there is no question that the primary line of defense
against turning copyrights into backdoor utility patents has been breached.
198. Crouch, supra note 141. For additional data on the high rate at which the PTO approves
design patents, see Dennis Crouch, Design Patent Rejections, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 19, 2010),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/01/design-patent-rejections.html
[https://perma.cc/5EJWWZ4D] (providing data on design patent rejection and approval rates).
199. Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 30, at 125. For examples, see supra notes 18–21 and
accompanying text.
200. Crouch, supra note 141, at 12, 15–16.
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reference such that it is identical to the claim.201 In the case of Apple v.
Samsung, for example, the Federal Circuit upheld Apple’s design
patents on the rectangular shape of the iPad even though there were
very similar references in the prior art.202
Figure 1: Apple’s “Novel and Nonobvious” Design Compared to Prior
Art

Cases like this demonstrate that the courts and the PTO are
interpreting the doctrinal screen to impose a lower hurdle on claimants
than the statutory language would suggest. Rather than assessing
cleverness or inventiveness in design, the PTO and courts apply
mechanical rules that are easy to satisfy. In fact, the creativity threshold
in design patent law is so low that it hardly seems different from
copyright law’s originality requirement.
Second, designers whose patent applications are rejected can keep
coming back to the PTO and filing requests for further examination.
201. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1326–30 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
202. Id.

INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN FC (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

INTELLIGENT DESIGN

9/17/2018 11:37 AM

115

No application can ever be finally rejected; the designer can always
refile and, in so doing, wear down the PTO examiner until the patent
is finally granted.203
The third reason for design patent law’s incredibly low rejection
rate is that it is quite difficult for the PTO to effectively examine design
patents. Design patents are not as easily searched as utility patents, and
they cannot be identified as easily using keywords. This is part of the
challenge associated with comparisons based entirely on visual
claims.204 All told, the PTO has a difficult time determining whether a
design is actually new and nonobvious, and the result is a proliferation
of patents that should not exist.
Both the PTO and defendants are further hampered in challenging
design patents’ validity by recent changes to the doctrines of
ornamentality and functionality.205 While design patent law provides
more protection of hybrid functional-aesthetic elements than copyright
law traditionally did,206 it should not protect purely utilitarian product
features. But recent case law has all but abandoned that functionality
limitation, allowing protection even of purely functional elements
where the alternative is not to protect a particular element of a
design.207 Design patent’s already lax doctrinal screen has become even
laxer.208
The Federal Circuit has proven willing to protect even the purely
functional aspects of design as long as they have some relationship with
ornamental ones.209 For example, in Sport Dimension v. Coleman, the
case mentioned in the Introduction, the design patent at issue covered
203. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 63, 82–84 (2004); Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 12, at 705–07.
204. On the problem of defining and analyzing the scope of visual works elsewhere in IP, see
Rebecca Tushnet, Worth A Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683
(2012).
205. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1, 1332–36.
206. Du Mont & Janis, supra note 125, at 281.
207. Id.
208. Menell and Yablon oddly criticize academics, including some of the authors, for pointing
out in a brief that this is true and claim that we “argue for expanding design patent protection.”
Menell & Yablon, supra note 192, at 5 n.32. Not so. We do not argue that design patents should
reach a combination of functional and ornamental elements, but instead point out that design
patent law currently does offer such protection, a point that Menell and Yablon do not even
address, much less refute. They do not discuss the current cases permitting design patent
protection for functional elements, and so may misunderstand the current expansive state of
design patents.
209. See Lee & Sunder, supra note 30, at 560–62 (noting the willingness of the Federal Circuit
to protect purely functional aspects of design).
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a life jacket-style flotation device with armbands.210 During claim
construction, the district court excluded the armbands from the claim,
because it found them to be functional.211 The Federal Circuit agreed
that the armbands were functional, but it held that the district court
had wrongly excluded them from the claim.212 According to the Federal
Circuit, the district court should instead have viewed the design as a
whole, including the functional features.213 Each element of the design
was entitled to protection, even if it was purely functional, as long as
the overall design had some ornamental elements.214
Similarly, in Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc.,215 the
district court had “factored out” certain elements of a handle for
ultrasonic shears—like the trigger and an on/off button—that were
driven by functional considerations.216 The Federal Circuit reversed.
The court held that as long as the entirety of the design was not fully
dictated by functional considerations, courts could not exclude the
individually functional elements from protection.217 It specifically
noted that the scope of the design patents extended to the combination
of those elements, even though they were functional.218
Even if the Federal Circuit were to reverse course and apply more
traditional understandings of novelty and functionality, that would
only partially solve the problem. If a design patent is granted, it still has
some value to its owner, even if it is possible (or even likely) that it
would later be invalidated if challenged in court. If the patent’s
invalidity is not obvious or certain, or if the cost of discovering that
invalidity is high, the patent’s owner will usually be able to extract a
settlement of some value from an accused infringer. The settlement
may be substantial, if the patent’s validity is plausible, or it may be
merely a nuisance-value settlement. But it will not be zero. And the
settlement value will be enhanced by the high level of damages
available to patent plaintiffs. If design patent owners are able to realize
private value through even invalid patents, they are imposing costs on

210. Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., 820 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
211. Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., No. CV 14-00438, 2015 WL 13309300 at *9 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 9, 2015).
212. Sport Dimension, 820 F.3d at 1321–22.
213. Id. at 1323.
214. Id.
215. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
216. Id. at 1328.
217. Id. at 1334.
218. Id.
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consumers and other designers. These are low private value/negative
social value patents that design patent’s failing doctrinal screen is
allowing to slip through.
Such patents should, in theory, be deterred by design patent’s
costly screen. This would make obtaining a design patent sufficiently
expensive that applicants would refrain from applying for low private
value patents. In reality, however, design patent’s costly screen is not
nearly as effective as one might hope. Recall that the total cost of
obtaining a design patent is roughly $5000.219 This is not trivial, but it
pales in comparison to the cost of obtaining a utility patent, which is
approximately $35,000 in PTO fees and attorney costs.220 Five thousand
dollars is much less than what even a dubious design patent might be
worth. Again, the potential for design patent owners to win substantial
damages awards due to the lack of damages apportionment can turn
even questionable patents into valuable private assets. An upfront
application cost of $5000 will weed out only the most frivolous design
patent applications while allowing many others through. In light of the
high grant rate for design patents and the incentives to file for even
weaker design patents, this too-low costly screen poses significant
problems. Designers can (and do) obtain multiple patents on different
configurations of their designs.221 This suggests that the costly screen
isn’t very costly. And, because they can submit dozens of applications
simultaneously, the costs of drafting and prosecution are probably even
lower.
The upshot is that design patents are too easy to obtain, both as a
matter of doctrine and expense. Design patent law is meant to award
these powerful IP rights only to designers who have contributed
valuable new designs, and it is meant to deter putative applicants from
even applying for low private value/negative social value designs. It

219. See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text.
220. In 2017, a utility patent application requires payment of $280 in filing fees, 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.16(a) (2017), $600 in search fees, 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(k), $720 in examination fees, 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.16(o), and $960 in issuance fees, 37 C.F.R. § 1.18(a)(1), for a total of $2560 in upfront fees.
The PTO also charges maintenance fees for patents that remain in force, which totaled $12,600
over the life of a patent in 2017. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)–(g). Design patents, by contrast, do not need
to pay maintenance fees. 37 C.F.R. § 1.362(b). Most applicants also hire attorneys, and fees for
preparing and prosecuting patents typically run from $15,000 to $25,000, depending upon the
complexity of the invention. Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 12, at 699. In total, then, a typical
utility patent costs roughly $35,000 to obtain and maintain.
221. See generally Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Jason J.
Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Virtual Designs, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 107 (2013); Michael J. Risch,
Functionality and Graphical User Interface Design Patents, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 53 (2013).
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accomplishes neither of these tasks. By consequence, every day there
are design patents granted that do more harm than good, driving up
prices for consumers and taxing genuine creativity. If either the
doctrinal screen or the costly screen had failed independently, the
problem would be significant. The simultaneous and conjoint failures
of both screens is calamitous. And it goes some way toward explaining
the dramatic rise in design patenting.
Figure 2: Design Patents Issued Per Year222

C. The Additional Problem with Overlapping Trade Dress Protection
The screening rules of copyright and patent law are further
complicated by the availability of design protection via trade dress law.
Designers can assert exclusive rights in the shape of a product or its
packaging under trade dress law.223 These rights are not meant to
stimulate new creativity in design, but instead to prevent consumers

222. Dennis Crouch, Design Patents Per Fiscal Year: New High Expected for FY2017,
PATENTLY-O, (Aug. 14, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/08/design-patents-expected.
html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PatentlyO+%
28Dennis+Crouch%27s+Patently-O%29 [https://perma.cc/W66A-QFJD].
223. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
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from being confused about the product’s origin. For example, if
consumers associate the rubber toe bumper and molding on a shoe as
an indication that the shoe was produced by Converse, then Converse
can attempt to use trade dress law to prevent competitors from making
similarly designed shoes.224 But trade dress protection fits uneasily
within the channeling scheme that Congress created for copyrights and
design patents, and it renders the task of screening designs even more
difficult.225
Because trade dress law allows firms to obtain protection for
product design, it shares copyright and design patent laws’ concerns
with extending protection to functional elements.226 But trade dress
law’s doctrinal and costly screens differ from those used by the other
regimes. Trade dress law imposes no creativity screen for marks or
designs.227 A design is protectable even if it is identical to prior designs
and was copied from them as long as the claimant can establish that
consumers treat the design as indicating the source of the product.228
This non-screen isn’t even as rigorous as copyright law’s trivial
originality requirement. Trade dress protection is, however, subject to
a costly screen, although one that operates differently from patent
law’s. Trade dress is only protectable once it has become
“distinctive,”229 and a company often must spend an enormous amount
of money on marketing to get consumers to associate the design with
the company. Requiring a design to acquire distinctiveness over time
through sales or advertising imposes a substantial cost and serves as a
meaningful costly screen.
Trade dress law also imposes a doctrinal screen for functionality
that resembles the one copyright law applied prior to Star Athletica.230

224. Bill Donahue, ITC Spells Out How Broad Use Sunk Converse Sneaker TM, LAW360
(July 14, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/817642 [https://perma.cc/L43Y-4FDM].
225. Cf. Robert G. Bone, Trademark Functionality Reexamined, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183,
190 (2015) (noting that trade dress protection frustrates the monopoly-deterring purpose of the
functionality doctrine). See generally Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling?,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873 (2010) (noting the channeling functions of intellectual property
law).
226. McKenna, supra note 225, at 875–76.
227. See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Role of Creativity in Trademark Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1885, 1886–87 (2011).
228. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (allowing trade dress
protection for the design of a Mexican restaurant). The design is protectable if it has acquired
“secondary meaning” as a designation of the source of the goods.
229. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212–14 (2000).
230. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1, 1327–28.
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Producers cannot obtain trade dress protection for any aspect of the
design that is “essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it
affects the cost or quality of the device.”231 This functionality screen is
more rigorous than design patent law’s (and presumably than the postStar Athletica copyright screen). This is illustrated by Apple v.
Samsung. There, the Federal Circuit held that certain functional
features of the iPhone could not be protected under trade dress law but
could be protected by a design patent.232 However, courts and the PTO
do not always apply the functionality screen with consistent rigor. For
example, the registered trade dress of Coca-Cola’s distinctive bottle
design or Converse’s rubber toe bumper and molding both contribute
to their designs’ functionality, but they are treated as protectable.233
Trade dress law thus sits awkwardly alongside the other IP
doctrines that exist to protect designs.234 Without a doctrinal screen for
novelty and nonobviousness, trade dress law does little to ensure that
rights are only granted to designs that contribute to social welfare.235
Moreover, trade dress protection, once obtained, can last forever.236
Accordingly, if designers are ever able to sneak functional elements
past trade dress law’s functionality screen, they can obtain rights that
significantly hinder competition and innovation.237 That unfortunately
occurs in some cases despite the Supreme Court’s imposition of a
doctrinal bar against functional trade dress in TrafFix.238
231. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (holding that a dual
spring design for a sign could not receive trademark protection because it was functional, as
evidenced by an expired utility patent).
232. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 989–99 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
233. In re Certain Footwear Prods., U.S. Int’l Trade Comm. Inv. No. 337-TA-936, at 57–64
(Nov.
17,
2015),
https://www.manatt.com/uploadedFiles/Content/4_News_and_Events/
Newsletters/IPandInternetLaw@manatt/ConverseITCopinion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LE9VWTHS] (concluding, incorrectly in our opinion, that a rubber toe guard wasn’t functional for an
athletic shoe).
234. See generally Laura Heymann, Policing the Copyright/Trademark Divide, 60 SMU L.
REV. 55 (2007).
235. That’s because trade dress law doesn’t have the same incentive-based rationale that
copyright and patent laws do.
236. DONALD S. CHISUM, TYLER T. OCHOA, SHUBHA GHOSH & MARY LAFRANCE,
UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 521 (2d ed. 2011).
237. Dennis Crouch has suggested that trade dress can combine with design patents, since
design patents provide temporary protection that allows the patentee to build the secondary
meaning necessary for trade dress protection. See generally Crouch, supra note 141. But that will
be a problem only if trade dress’s functionality doctrine also fails.
238. See, e.g., Leapers, Inc. v. SMTS, L.L.C., 879 F.3d 731 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that a
reasonable jury could find that a pattern of texturing applied to rifle scopes to make them easier
to grip was nonfunctional).
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D. The Dystopian Reality of IP Screening
The principal concern generated by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Star Athletica is that copyright law will no longer rigorously police
functionality. This would allow designers to obtain protection for the
functional elements of designs via copyright without having to
overcome design patent law’s high creativity threshold, short duration,
and costly screen. That protection would then last for a century, rather
than design patent’s fifteen years.
As we have explained, however, many of the benefits of
channeling functional designs away from copyright and into the design
patent regime are chimerical. Very few designs are excluded by the
latter’s doctrinal creativity screens, and its supposedly costly screen
isn’t very costly. Design patent law’s screens are already allowing
through nearly every design. In addition, we suspect that the enormous
difference in duration between copyrights and design patents may not,
in fact, be all that meaningful in practice. Product designs, including
those that incorporate functionality, tend to have relatively short shelf
lives.239 Accordingly, the market power differences between fifteen
years and a century may not be that great. IP protection that covered
(for instance) the shape of a floppy diskette, film canister, or fax
machine would have had virtually zero value after a few decades as
those products became obsolete.240 The additional years of copyright
protection that extended beyond the fifteen-year design patent term
would generate little private value or social cost. In cases like these,
where the product is truly obsolete, we would not even expect rights to
have significant nuisance value or impose substantial search costs.
Competitors simply aren’t trying to make these products. While some
industrial designs have enduring market value—the Eames chair, the
Burberry trench coat, or the classic Coca-Cola bottle—these are the
exceptions that prove the rule of short shelf life.241
The weaknesses of the screens that control access to these two
regimes compound one another. The reason is that designers are not
required to select only one of the available design regimes. There is no

239. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). See WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING, act 3, sc. 3 (“[T]he fashion wears out more
apparel than the man.”).
240. This is the process that Schumpeter refers to as “creative destruction.” JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82–85 (1942).
241. Indeed, even Coca-Cola is not normally sold in its iconic shape any longer, except as a
novelty item.
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doctrine of election that requires a designer to choose between
copyright and design patent when obtaining IP over a design. Rather,
any designer can obtain both types of protection for the same designs.
In addition, the designer can also seek trade dress protection running
parallel to copyright and design patent protection.
The ability to obtain copyright, trade dress, and design patent
protection for the same design element creates all sorts of
opportunities for designers to exploit the overlapping advantages of
these systems. For instance, it is typically easier for a plaintiff to prove
that a design patent is infringed than to prove that a copyright is
infringed, because independent creation is not a defense to design
patent infringement. At the same time, it is typically easier for a
plaintiff to establish that a copyright is valid than that a design patent
is, because copyrights need not be novel and nonobvious. Accordingly,
a designer could seek both a copyright and a design patent and choose
which right to enforce against a given defendant depending upon
whether that defendant is likely to have better defenses related to
infringement—in which case the plaintiff asserts the design patent—or
invalidity—in which case the plaintiff asserts the copyright.
Similarly, designers can choose which rights to assert to maximize
the damages they recover. If the design encompasses all aspects of the
infringing product, the designer can assert a copyright, knowing that
she will be able to obtain essentially full damages because the profit is
attributable entirely to the design. If the infringing product involves
both infringing and noninfringing design elements, the plaintiff can
instead elect to assert a design patent in order to avoid having damages
apportioned. For instance, a plaintiff could capture the profits of an
entire car based solely on the design of one small part.242
Copyrights also offer the option of obtaining what amount to
“design patent lite” protection for decades after the design patent has
expired. The designer could rely upon the more powerful design
patents for the first fifteen years, then switch to copyrights after the
design patents have expired. As we noted, in many cases the extra

242. See Mark A. Lemley, A Rational System of Design Patent Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 219 (2013) (discussing examples of overclaiming that result from this rule); cf. Automotive
Body Parts Ass’n v. Ford Glob. Techs., LLC, 293 F. Supp. 3d 690, 701–04 (E.D. Mich. 2018)
(upholding design patents on functional automobile parts). The Supreme Court’s decision in
Samsung v. Apple might limit this problem by allowing courts to define the “article of
manufacture” more narrowly. See generally Samsung Elecs. Co., v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429
(2016); Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2017).
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decades of protection will be largely irrelevant.243 But the ability to
capture those additional out-years of rents will be valuable to some
designers, and these designers can do so at roughly zero cost.244
Most importantly, and most realistically, designers can assert both
types of rights against the same defendants in the same cases.245 If the
two causes of action are at all independent—that is, if they do not rise
or fall on precisely the same factors—designers will have two bites at
the same apple. Even if the design patent claim founders for some
reason, the copyright claim may still prevail, or vice versa. Simply as a
matter of mathematics, a design plaintiff can transform two dubious
rights into one source of strong protection. For instance, imagine that
a design patent and a copyright are each only 50 percent likely to be
found valid and infringed by a particular defendant design. If the two
causes of action are completely independent, the plaintiff is 75 percent
likely to prevail on at least one of the two. Of course, it is unlikely that
the two causes of action will ever be entirely independent, particularly
on the issue of infringement. But even partial independence will allow
the IP holder to leverage the two rights to obtain greater protection
than either regime would separately allow. Moreover, by bringing two
claims instead of one, the plaintiff will increase the defendant’s
litigation costs to defend through trial. In other contexts, scholars have
demonstrated that offering IP rights-holders the choice between two
legal regimes can artificially inflate the power of IP rights and distort
the operation of the IP system.246 Option value by itself is bad enough.
Permitting designers to opt for both IP regimes is potentially far worse.
243. See supra notes 239–41 and accompanying text.
244. This could be particularly relevant in the world of fashion. As styles go in and out of
vogue over periods of decades, copyrights that had fallen into desuetude could again become
valuable. It might also be particularly relevant to designs that incorporate substantial functional
elements. Even if the design is no longer in vogue, the functional elements might remain useful
and widespread.
245. See, e.g., Complaint, Quan v. Ty, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-05683 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 3, 2017)
(alleging infringements of both copyright and design patent on plush toys). We have not yet seen
many cases where plaintiffs have asserted both copyrights and design patents, but there are
volumes of cases asserting both copyrights and trademarks or design patents and trademarks for
the same features. Cf. Heymann, supra note 234, at 65–67 (noting that copyright law and
trademark law are motivated by fundamentally different concerns); Moffat, supra note 48
(arguing that industrial designs already entitled to functionality-based intellectual property
protections should not be copyrightable).
246. Omri Ben-Shahar, Damages for Unlicensed Use, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 15–18 (2011)
(describing the distortions introduced when plaintiffs have the option of selecting between two
damages regimes). But see John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX L.
REV. 629 (2016) (suggesting some situations in which redundancy of legal doctrines may be
useful).
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IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Design law gives people too many ways to obtain too many rights.
As a result, IP law grants design rights that are broader than they
should be, rights that aren’t worth the social cost to have around, and
rights that overlap in ways that undo the calibration that individual IP
regimes are supposed to provide. In this section, we consider policy
changes designed to bring design rights more in line with social welfare.
A. Reining in Overpowered Design Rights
One set of approaches focuses on the fact that design rights have
become too powerful, inducing too many designers to seek and enforce
protection even when it is not socially optimal to do so. We consider
several approaches to mitigate the excessive power of design rights in
this section.
Many of the problems discussed above stem from the ability of IP
owners to use tools directed at ornamentation (design patent,
copyright) or reputation (trademark) to achieve what the law intends
only utility patents to provide: control over the function of the item
itself.247 One solution to the problem is to try to shore up the doctrinal
screens that prevent design-related rights from bleeding over into
backdoor utility patents. This won’t make design rights more costly,
but it will reduce the ability to capture inappropriate value—value in
excess of what the designer has really created—with those rights. It will
therefore reduce the temptation to invest in negative social value rights
that generate positive private value. A number of scholars have
suggested ways to shore up these screens.248
If we can’t fix the functionality doctrine, we might modify IP law
in other ways to try to restore balance to the system. As we explained
in Part III, neither the PTO nor the courts seem to be applying the
nominally high creativity threshold that design patent law demands.
Patent law’s novelty and nonobviousness standards are intended to
impose a significant hurdle for claimants. But while the PTO and the
courts have demonstrated some willingness to reject utility patents on
these grounds, they have not done so for design patents.249 When prior
art discloses a design that substantially anticipates the principal

247. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1295.
248. See, e.g., id.; Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018); McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 42; Risch, supra note 221, at 62–64.
249. See supra Part II.D.
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features of the claimant’s design, as with Apple’s patent on a rectangle
with rounded corners, the PTO should deny the patent or the courts
should invalidate it. Design patent law shouldn’t grant substantially
stronger protection than copyright law while simultaneously applying
a similarly trivial creativity threshold.
Copyright has the converse problem. Just as design patent law has
adopted copyright’s lax approach to creativity screening, copyright
law’s functionality screen has moved towards design patent law’s lax
standard.250
We could make it harder to obtain design patents by raising the
obviousness bar. Right now, a challenge to a design patent or
application must satisfy a two-step test in which the PTO or defendant
must first “find a single reference . . . the design characteristics of which
are basically the same as the claimed design.”251 Put another way, a
design won’t be judged as obvious even if it combined elements from
two different prior art designs. But as Maureen Long has argued,252 that
rule violates the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex Inc.253 Understanding that a designer of ordinary skill might
combine elements from prior designs, and that it is obvious to do so,
could reduce the incidence of weak design patents claiming obvious
designs.
There may also be ways to limit the damage Star Athletica did in
copyright law. While the Supreme Court’s decision allows at least some
protection for the functional aspects of a useful article, courts might
use other copyright doctrines such as section 102(b)’s prohibition on
protection for ideas, systems, or methods or the fair use doctrine to
restrict the reach of the resulting copyrights.254
But there may still be ways for courts to restore the division
between design and function that Congress intended. In design patent
law, the undoing of the functionality screen is the work of the Federal
Circuit alone. It finds no basis in Supreme Court precedent, and it is at
odds with the way functionality is treated in trademark cases. Indeed,
250. See supra Part II.D.
251. Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting In re
Rosen, 673 F.2d 388, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
252. Maureen Long, The Nonobviousness Requirement for Design Patents: What is the
Standard and Why Shouldn’t It Obviously Be Modified After KSR?, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 193 (2017);
see also Lee & Sunder, supra note 30, at 563 (discussing nonobviousness and the decision in K.S.R.
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)).
253. K.S.R. Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
254. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 107 (2012).
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in Apple v. Samsung, the Federal Circuit went so far as to hold that the
very same features both were functional under trademark law and were
not functional under design patent law.255 The Supreme Court declined
to resolve that issue, reversing the case on the issue of damages
instead.256 The Court should take a case to resolve this issue. When it
does, it should reintroduce an effective form of functionality screening
to design patents. That is what the statute requires, and it is how design
patent law has historically operated until recent Federal Circuit
decisions.257 Applying Richardson (which rejected patents on
functional aspects of tools)258 and rejecting Coleman (which allowed
patents on functional elements of a flotation device)259 would be a good
start.
Copyright functionality is a somewhat harder problem, because
the Supreme Court seemed to suggest in Star Athletica that copyright
could protect even the functional aspects of a utilitarian work as long
as courts could envision creative elements in that work.260 That risks
making copyright design protection cheap indeed. It also eliminates the
filters on scope that prevented every copyright in a utilitarian work
from becoming an automatic backdoor utility patent.261 It’s not clear
that the Court intended to dismantle the functionality screen in
copyright, rather than simply concluding that there was something
worth protecting in a simple design for a cheerleader uniform. And it
is entirely possible that courts interpreting Star Athletica will grant
copyright protection to such works but narrow the scope of that
protection to prevent designers from effectively copyrighting
functional elements.262 That’s what we think they should do, if the case
isn’t going to be changed by statute.263 Doing so would reduce the

255. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 991–92 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
256. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 436 (2016).
257. Risch, supra note 221, at 73–77.
258. Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293–94 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
259. Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., 820 F.3d 1316, 1320–23 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
260. Star Athletica, L.L.C., v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1013–14 (2017).
261. That’s not what Congress intended. Indeed, it is notable that the Court, in an opinion
otherwise purportedly concerned with the plain meaning of the statute, ignored completely the
most pertinent part of the very statutory section it was interpreting. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)
(explaining that pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works “shall include works of artistic
craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned”);
see also Buccafusco & Fromer, supra note 103.
262. See supra Part III.A. (discussing the effects of Star Athletica on the ability to copyright
functional elements).
263. See generally Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1324; Mark A. Lemley & Mark P.

INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN FC (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

INTELLIGENT DESIGN

9/17/2018 11:37 AM

127

incidence of cheap copyrights with negative social value that impede
the follow-on design. But there is no question that Star Athletica made
the line between design protection and functional IP rights fuzzier than
ever. In an ideal world, Congress would pass new legislation overriding
Star Athletica and restoring copyright’s traditional functional screen.
But since that seems unlikely, courts should consider other options.
B. Election of Rights
A second way to tackle the problem of cheap backdoor utility
patents is to focus on the problem of overlap between IP rights. As we
noted in Part II, at least before Star Athletica different IP regimes were
calibrated in different ways. Design patents were intended to be rarer,
more costly, shorter, and harder to get than copyrights, but they
conferred significantly stronger rights. Copyrights were cheap and
simple to get but came with significant limitations designed to prevent
their use as backdoor utility patents. And trademark law has special
requirements that limit its use to particular circumstances in which a
design is valued not for what it is, but for what it represents. In the bestcase scenario, creations would be channeled to the one correct
doctrinal bucket that appropriately balanced social costs and benefits
for designs of that type. IP rights would be offered as a menu of options
from which the designer could select the legal regime that best fit her
creation.
The concept of one choice from a menu of options was an
appropriate metaphor for much of IP law’s history. For years, IP law
explicitly incorporated a “doctrine of election.” Under this doctrine, a
creator had to choose one—but only one—form of protection for her
work.264 We don’t mean that a design couldn’t fall within the subject
matter of more than one IP regime; it is well established that copyright,
design patent, utility patent, and trade dress might all coexist within a
single product. Rather, the doctrine of election meant that where two

McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2242–43 (2015); McKenna, supra note 193, at
127.
264. See Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, U.S. Design Patent Law: A Historical Look at the
Design Patent/Copyright Interface, in THE COPYRIGHT/DESIGN INTERFACE: PAST, PRESENT &
FUTURE 351 (Estelle Derclaye ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2018) (providing a detailed discussion
of the history of design patent and copyright interface); Douglas R. Wolf, The Doctrine of
Elections: Has the Need to Choose Been Lost?, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 439, 439 (1991)
(“Historically, the Doctrine of Elections . . . limited the creator of an ornamental design to only
one form of protection. Over time, the Doctrine has been substantially abandoned.” (citation
omitted)).
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or more IP rights did overlap, the IP owner had to choose which form
of protection she wanted.265 Obtaining a design patent meant foregoing
copyright protection over the same design elements, and vice versa.
Similarly, a copyright or design patent over a work meant the shape of
the work wasn’t also eligible for trade dress protection.266
The doctrine of election was rejected by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in 1974 in In re Yardley.267 That case held that a watch
featuring a caricature of then-Vice President Spiro Agnew could be
both copyrighted and design patented. Yardley was based on the
(correct) proposition that different IP rights have different purposes,
and if a work has many parts it may be appropriate to protect different
parts with different regimes. We have no quarrel with that reasoning.
Indeed, utility patents and design patents have long protected different
aspects of the same product.268 But the absence of a doctrine of election
has increasingly meant that IP owners use different IP regimes to
protect the same aspects of the same works, leading to overlapping
protection.269 Thus, a designer might obtain a design patent with its
relatively strong rights, then claim a copyright in the same aspects of
the work once the design patent expires, and then even claim a
trademark in the design should the copyright ever expire.270 As we
described in Part III.D, this allows a designer to leverage the
advantages of all of these systems simultaneously, rather than
accepting the limitations of a given system as the price of obtaining its

265. Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 182 F. 150, 152 (E.D. Pa. 1910) (“Since
[the work of art] was qualified for admission into the two statutory classes, I see no reason why it
might not be placed in either. But it could not enter both.”).
266. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637,
642 (2d Cir. 1958) (L. Hand, J.); Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir.
1943); Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929); In re Blood, 23
F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Louis De Jonge & Co., 182 F. at 152; In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528
(C.C.P.A. 1969) (no design and utility patent on same attribute); In re Guild, 204 F.2d 700
(C.C.P.A. 1953); William A. Meier Co., v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F. Supp. 264 (W.D.
Pa. 1951); Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1936); Ex parte Guild, 98
U.S.P.Q. 464 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1952), aff’d on other grounds, In re Guild, 204 F.2d at 700; Ex
parte Fulda, 1913 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 210 (1913).
267. In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
268. E.g., Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 433–35 (2016) (noting that the
same devices can be protected by both design patents and utility patents).
269. See Complaint at 3–5, Quan v. Ty, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-05683 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 3, 2017).
270. The oldest of us is fifty-one years old, and copyrights have never expired in any of our
lifetimes because Congress keeps retroactively extending copyright terms. The most recent
extension added twenty years to copyright terms, and that was nineteen years ago. We’ll see this
year if it happens again.
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benefits.271
Perhaps it is time to bring back the doctrine of election.272 The fact
that it is too cheap and easy to get strong protection for industrial
designs means that the law should look for some other way to limit the
power of IP over design. An election doctrine would not solve all the
problems we identified in Part III. If it is too easy to get design patents,
the fact that a designer can’t also get copyright protection on the work
isn’t a complete solution. And if it is too easy to protect functionality
through copyright, the fact that a designer can’t also obtain a design
patent doesn’t solve that problem either. But requiring election would
provide a remedy in an important class of cases in which we make
design protection too cheap and too strong—cases in which the IP
owner benefits from layering different protections to avoid the limits
of each doctrine. That is particularly true when short-term rights like
utility patents and design patents expire. Giving long-term or even
perpetual protection through copyright or trade dress to elements that
also received the benefits of strong patent rights undoes the public
benefit of the patent bargain: the promise that the world will have
access to the design once the patent expires.
Bringing back election would not necessarily require legislative
action. The history of the election doctrine is curious, because its
demise in the copyright and design patent context can be traced to a
single appellate case—In re Yardley.273 True, that court—the Court of
Claims and Patent Appeals—heard all appeals from the Patent and
Trademark Office, but at the time it didn’t even hear infringement
suits. Meanwhile, at the time of Yardley the regional circuits and
district courts had unanimously adopted the doctrine of election.

271. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (refusing Koosh ball
copyright registration where product was already patented; patentee wanted the benefits of easier
enforcement through copyright).
272. For an early suggestion that we should do something similar with software, see Michael
J. Kline, Requiring an Election of Protection for Patentable/Copyrightable Computer Programs, 6
COMP. L.J. 607 (1986).
273. To the extent Congress thought about the issue at all, it seems to have assumed that
copyright protection was possible for utilitarian works only if the IP owner had not obtained a
design patent for the same work. Herbert Putnam, Esq., then Librarian of Congress and active in
the movement to amend the copyright laws, told the joint meeting of the House and Senate
Committees:
The term [“]works of art[”] is deliberately intended as a broader specification than
[“]works of the fine arts[”] in the present statute with the idea that there is subjectmatter (for instance, of applied design, not yet within the province of design patents),
which may properly be entitled to protection under the copyright law.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213 (1954).
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Nonetheless, when the influential Nimmer treatise endorsed
Yardley,274 IP stakeholders just began taking it for granted that a
designer could protect the same design element using multiple IP
regimes. The Copyright Office acquiesced in 1995, allowing
registration of works that had already been patented.275
Since Yardley, the IP world has taken as given that overlapping
protection is the norm. But neither the Supreme Court nor the regional
circuits have ever endorsed the elimination of the election doctrine.
Indeed, there are good reasons to think the Supreme Court would not
do so. Election is common in other areas of IP. Anyone who files for a
patent must elect to forego trade secret protection, and choosing trade
secrecy similarly precludes later obtaining a patent.276 In one important
decision, the Court seemed to implement an election doctrine between
copyright and trademark, sharply limiting the ability of IP owners to
assert trademark claims that effectively protected copyrighted works
once those copyrights had expired.277 In another, the Court held that
an expired utility patent was strong evidence that a design feature was
functional and could not be protected by trademark law.278 And it has
repeatedly held that design patents preempt state design-like rights
because of concerns that overlapping protection would allow IP owners
to circumvent the requirements of federal design patent law.279
Congress also endorsed the doctrine of election when it created a new
IP right covering boat hulls. It expressly provided that no designer
could obtain this new IP right on a boat hull that had already been the
subject of a design patent.280 While the Court has not considered the

274. Registrability of Pictorial, Graphic, or Sculptural Works Where a Design Patent Has
Been Issued, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,605, 15,606 (Mar. 24, 1995) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 202)
(quoting DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.19 (1994)). Pam
Samuelson has offered trenchant criticism of the prior edition of the Nimmer treatise, see
Samuelson , supra note 48, at 1495, and the new version of the treatise contains a much-revised
discussion of the election doctrine that is not as critical of it. See DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.07[B] (2018).
275. Registrability of Pictorial, Graphic, or Sculptural Works Where a Design Patent Has
Been Issued, 60 Fed. Reg. at 15,605.
276. See MARK A. LEMLEY, PETER S. MENELL & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 41(2017).
277. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
278. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
279. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964).
280. 17 U.S.C. § 1329 (2012).
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overlap problem in the context of copyright law,281 we think it should
draw the same conclusions there.282
Reinvigorating the doctrine of election is somewhat more
complicated since the 1976 Copyright Act, because copyright
protection is automatic.283 Surely one does not “elect” copyright over
design patent protection merely by creating a work that the law deems
automatically within the scope of copyright. We think the doctrine of
election should attach at the time a designer files for a design or utility
patent on a product attribute. Doing so would represent a choice not
to enforce any copyright claim on that attribute. Our proposal is that
courts should dismiss copyright lawsuits and the Copyright Office
should reject applications for registration that are brought on the basis
of elements that are already protected by an existing, pending, or
expired design patent. The creator would still own the copyright and
remain an author of the work. But she could not enforce that copyright
in court. Similarly, the Copyright Office should refuse to register a
copyright on any element for which a patent has already been filed.284
Conversely, bringing (or perhaps even threatening) a copyright
281. Mazer v. Stein acknowledged the doctrine of election in the case law but declined to rule
on it one way or the other. 347 U.S. 201, 205 (1954).
282. Indeed, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000), the Court
restricted the scope of trademark protection for product configurations because it was concerned
that trademark law could otherwise be used to circumvent the limitations then imposed by
copyright law. It is true that in Star Athletica the Court allowed for the possibility that design
patent and copyright could protect the same utilitarian articles:
Moreover, we have long held that design patent and copyright are not mutually
exclusive. Congress has provided for limited copyright protection for certain features
of industrial design, and approaching the statute with presumptive hostility toward
protection for industrial design would undermine Congress’ choice.
Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1015 (2017) (citation omitted). But
that statement is not inconsistent with the doctrine of election. The Court held that the fact that
something was eligible for design patent protection didn’t disqualify it from copyright protection.
But it did not hold that IP owners could hold both forms of protection over the same element at
the same time. The same is true of J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.,
534 U.S. 124 (2001), which held that the developers of new plants could choose utility patents
rather than plant patents or a plant variety protection certificate. Election necessarily presupposes
that the IP owner has more than one type of right it could employ; the point is that it must choose
between them.
283. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 274, § 2A.07[C](1) (Supp. 2018) (noting that
“identifying a plaintiff’s unequivocal choice of regime through registration posed little ambiguity”
when copyright registration was required for protection).
284. This would require the Copyright Office to communicate with the PTO and engage in a
limited amount of research each time a copyright registration is filed. However, given the nature
of copyrights and design patents, this should not be overly difficult. As one solution, the Copyright
Office could simply enact a rule requiring any copyright registrant to notify the office of all design
patents for which that registrant is a party in interest.
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lawsuit based on a product attribute should estop later efforts to patent
(or enforce a patent on) that product attribute. The PTO should also
dismiss any patent application that tries to claim an element that has
already been the subject matter of copyright litigation. We focus here
upon registration, litigation, and application because they are public
acts that occur at discrete moments in time. It would be comparatively
difficult (or impossible) to base election on the moment at which a
copyright is created, simply because copyrights spring into existence
instantaneously at the moment an author creates a work. Registration
and litigation are when that copyright becomes publicly known and
reified. There is of course the possibility that parties might try to game
this rule, particularly during the period during which a patent
application is held secret. But it should function well in most
circumstances, and it is certainly an improvement on the status quo.
We think election must be limited to individual features of a
product, rather than necessarily encompassing the product as a whole.
Complex products can have different attributes for which different IP
rights are appropriate. The design of an iPhone is different from the
operation of the WiFi technology inside that phone, and enforcing
rights in one shouldn’t prevent enforcement of the other. By contrast,
there is no reason for Apple to be able to use design patent, copyright,
and trade dress to enforce rights in the same design element, such as
the shape of the phone. Election would prevent disturbing results such
as Apple v. Samsung, where a failed trade dress case nonetheless
prevailed under a design patent theory.285
C. Narrowing the Scope of Design Rights
A final approach to the problem of too-powerful design rights
would be to narrow the scope and power of the rights we grant. The
functionality screens in copyright and design patent were intended to
do that,286 but as we have seen, they aren’t working. Congress could,
however, impose limits on the strength of design patent rights to better
align private and social value. One possibility is to change the current
rule on design patent damages. Unlike every other area of IP, a finding
of design patent infringement entitles the plaintiff to capture the
defendant’s entire profit from the “article of manufacture” without any
consideration of how valuable the design actually was or what other
285. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
286. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1324; Lemley & McKenna, supra note 263, at
2226–43; Lee & Sunder, supra note 30, at 584–85.
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features might have contributed to the value of the defendant’s
product.287 As one of us has observed elsewhere, that rule makes no
sense.288 The Supreme Court may have narrowed its reach in Samsung
v. Apple by permitting courts to define “article of manufacture”
narrowly,289 but a rule that doesn’t consider the relative value of the
design patent and other features of a product is absurd. Eliminating it
and applying the normal rules of IP damages would help tackle the
problem of overpowered design patents.
Second, we might consider introducing an independent invention
defense to design patents like the one we have in copyright law.290 The
ease of obtaining design patents and the ability to seek profits that are
disproportionate to the value of the design has led some to worry about
the problem of “design patent trolls,” plaintiffs who use their design
patents to try to strategically capture value in others’ similar designs.291
The rise of patents on individual images—rather than the shape of an
overall product—exacerbates this risk.292 Scholars have debated
whether utility patents should have a defense for independent
invention.293 Even if they shouldn’t, such a defense might make sense
for design patents, which are closer in purpose to copyright than to
utility patent. A design patent shouldn’t inhibit design simply to allow
its owner to engage in rent seeking; the design patent’s real purpose is
to prevent close imitation from destroying the incentives to invest in
design. Requiring plaintiffs to prove copying would be consistent with
that purpose. Doing so would, however, require Congress to act.
There may be other ways to narrow the scope of design patent
rights. The current practice of “dotted line” drawings allows patentees
to claim a particular curve or feature divorced from the product as a

287. 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012).
288. Lee & Sunder, supra note 30, at 588–89; Lemley, supra note 242.
289. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
290. See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text; see also Robert E. Suggs, A Functional
Approach to Copyright Policy, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1293, 1302 (2015); Rebecca Tushnet, The Eye
Alone Is the Judge: Images and Design Patents, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 409, 423 (2012).
291. See Sparapani, supra note 175 (discussing this problem).
292. Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 221, at 114–16.
293. For proposals for an independent invention defense, see Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights,
96 AM. ECON. REV. at 92, 95 (2006); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to
Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006); cf. Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent
Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525 (2007) (noting the benefits of
but also some potential problems with such an approach); Samson Vermont, The Angel Is in the
Big Picture: A Response to Lemley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1537 (2007).
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whole.294 And the use of black-and-white drawings means that designs
can infringe even if the colors of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s actual
products are not particularly similar.295 The PTO might instead require
the plaintiff to submit a photo or a computer-aided design drawing of
the actual or intended product and limit design patent infringement to
products that are similar to the design the plaintiff actually
implemented rather than the idealized one drawn by her lawyers.296
Doing so would require more similarity between the plaintiff’s design
and the defendant’s product before the plaintiff could prove
infringement.
D. Raising the Cost of Design Protection
A different set of solutions to the problem of socially harmful
design rights involves making the doctrinal screening mechanisms for
design protection more effective. Doing so would have the collateral
effect of making obtaining design rights more costly. This, in turn,
would dissuade firms from filing applications for especially dubious
design patents, thus reducing the number of low private value/negative
social value patents in existence and mitigating the design patent troll
problem.297
One way to start is to improve the examination process. As we
have seen, design patents are virtually never rejected at the PTO for
lack of novelty or obviousness.298 While this is not proof that the PTO,
as currently constituted, is poorly equipped to examine design patents,
there are reasons to think that the agency is in fact hamstrung. The
PTO likely has a very difficult time locating relevant design prior art
because it is harder to search for shapes than for words. The PTO rarely
issues even initial rejections, suggesting that it isn’t narrowing design
patents’ scope before allowing them.299 This situation might have been
tolerable in the past, but as the scope and power of design patents

294. Burstein, supra note 16, at 182–83.
295. Fromer & McKenna, supra note 248, at 45 n.263 and accompanying text.
296. Patentees would still need some mechanism to disclaim portions of the photographed
design, as they do today with dotted lines.
297. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971,
1161 U.N.T.S. 3, constrains our ability to impose a costly screen on copyright, though it might be
possible to impose a higher registration fee on U.S. (but not foreign) applicants, just as the law
now requires registration as a prerequisite to suit only for U.S. applicants. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)
(2012).
298. See supra notes 198–204.
299. Id.
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expand, the PTO’s ability to locate prior art needs to expand as well.
The agency should invest in improved search tools designed to find
prior art, and it should pay more attention to novelty in the
examination process.300
If the various doctrinal changes we’ve suggested are insufficient,
the PTO should also increase the cost of seeking or maintaining design
patent protection. This would be the most direct way of establishing a
meaningful costly screen to design patents.301 Design patents are an
excellent target for cost-based screening. The value of many designs is
low, and so a screen should have a significant effect on designers’
decisions regarding whether to file for patents.302 In addition, there is
not a well-established market for the sale of design patents to trolls,
which makes it less profitable for designers to seek nuisance patents.
A typical utility patent will cost roughly $35,000 to obtain and
maintain throughout its twenty-year lifetime.303 Perhaps design patents
should not cost quite this much, but the cost should be higher than the
current $5000.304 In particular, while owners of utility patents must pay
maintenance fees to keep a patent in force throughout its lifetime, the
PTO imposes no such fees on owners of design patents.305 The PTO
should consider imposing maintenance fees during a design patent
term, just as it does for utility patents. This could prevent opportunistic
enforcement while still allowing design patent owners to prevent rapid
copying.306 The PTO charges $12,600 to maintain a utility patent over
the course of its full twenty-year term.307 Design patents last 75 percent
as long. The PTO should consider imposing design patent maintenance
fees equal to 75 percent of that total, or roughly $9000.308
300. Cf. Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 83, at 1482 (noting that utility patent
examination is cursory, but that even this cursory examination well exceeds the examination of
design patents).
301. Fagundes & Masur, supra note 12, at 706.
302. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable
Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004) (arguing that many patents are too valuable to be deterred by a
costly screen).
303. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 166 and accompanying text; see also Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note
30, at 122–26 (arguing that design patent fees are justified).
305. See supra note 220.
306. Cf. Jonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO, 65 DUKE L.J. 1701 (2016) (describing the
beneficial effects of maintenance fees as a means of eliminating harmful patents while preserving
valid and valuable ones).
307. See supra note 220.
308. This is a particularly rough estimate because the value of an IP right is typically frontloaded in time and does not scale linearly with the length of the right. Supra notes 239–40 and
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There is a risk that higher fees will disproportionately affect
smaller designers, who may not have the liquid capital necessary to file
for patents on new designs. We do not think this will be an overly
significant concern, however. First, many small designers with valuable
designs should be able to raise the necessary funds through loans or
other types of investment.309 Some may be able to take advantage of
pro bono legal services. (Attorney’s fees are currently responsible for
the majority of the cost of obtaining a design patent.310) Smaller entities
could also receive discounts on design patent filing fees, as they already
do for utility patents,311 or fees could scale with the total number of
patents filed by a given entity. In addition, the PTO could substantially
increase the costs of filing continuation patents, which use an earlier
patent application to retain the first’s priority date.312 Continuation
patents are one of the principle means by which companies like Apple
obtain many patents over the same product. Because continuation
patents may be less important for small scale designers, charging higher
fees for them may produce the appropriate distributional effect.
The PTO could also impose substantial maintenance fees on
design patents while holding up-front application fees constant.313
Choosing maintenance fees over up-front examination fees might
reduce the worry that higher fees would discourage small firms and
individuals from seeking protection. Waiting until a design has been
patented and been in the market for several years gives independent
designers the time to turn the design into a success. But by the same
token, it presents the risk that plaintiffs will obtain and enforce cheap
design patents early in their life.
Increased costly screens can complement improved doctrinal
screening. Higher examination or maintenance fees would both

accompanying text; see Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases,
101 GEO. L.J. 637, 672 (2013). In addition, design patents, while powerful, are less powerful than
utility patents. Nonetheless, absent a more precise figure, this type of maintenance fee would
almost surely be an improvement upon the status quo.
309. Kickstarter lists tens of thousands of design projects that are currently seeking
crowdfunding. KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/discover/categories/design/product
%20design [https://perma.cc/P6EG-PG28] (last visited May 29, 2018).
310. See supra note 220.
311. Neel U. Sukhatme, Regulatory Monopoly and Differential Pricing in the Market for
Patents, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1855, 1881–83 (2014).
312. See In re Owens, 710 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (discussing claiming for continuation
patents).
313. Although maintenance fees are required for utility patents, they are not required for
design patents. 37 C.F.R. § 1.362(b) (2017).
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increase the potency of design patent’s costly screen and provide
funding for improved substantive examination—that is, a more
effective creativity screen.314 Moreover, they would likely do so without
deterring much (if any) valuable design creation. At the same time,
improved patent examination would naturally augment the costly
screen because it would increase the cost of hiring an attorney to
prosecute a patent application.
Congress could also increase the cost of enforcing both copyrights
and design patents. While litigation is expensive for both plaintiffs and
defendants, IP owners can often use the threat of litigation to scare
even defendants who are behaving lawfully into caving and settling.
The existence of contingency-fee lawyers in IP means that litigation is
often more costly for defendants than for plaintiffs.315 Congress could
increase the cost of litigation, for example, by charging a substantial fee
to file an IP infringement suit or perhaps even a small fee to send threat
letters. Raising the cost of enforcement rather than acquisition would
effectively apply a costly screen to copyrights as well as design patents.
And it would have the added benefit of allowing parties to acquire
design patents cheaply and then decide later whether it was worth the
expense to assert those patents.
E. Optimal Design Screening
While each of these approaches would help solve the problem of
excessive design rights, their effects are cumulative, and we worry that
pulling on too many levers at the same time might overshoot the mark.
In this section we discuss how these different approaches might
overlap.
If someone put us in charge of the world,316 we would begin with

314. See generally Roger Allan Ford, The Patent Spiral, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 839–40 (2016);
Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 12, at 699–703; Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality
with Applicant Incentives, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77, 103–08 (2014) (observing that if the PTO
rejects more overbroad patents, those patents become costlier to obtain in expectation).
315. Ronen Avraham & John M. Golden, From PI to IP: Yet Another Unexpected Effect of
Tort Reform, 20 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 168 (2018); David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee
Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335 (2012).
316. To be clear, we’re imagining a triumvirate in which the three of us takes turns running
the various branches of government in three-year terms. After a round robin miniature golf
tournament, we have determined that the initial distribution of responsibilities is Executive:
Masur, Judiciary: Lemley, Legislative: Buccafusco. Eminem will serve as ambassador to the
United Nations.
If we did in fact control the government, we doubt that optimizing design protection would
be high on our agenda, but we would get to it at some point, and this is what it would look like.
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doctrinal screens as a first-order solution. First, we would return to a
world that resembled the one that existed prior to Star Athletica.
Copyright law should have virtually no creativity threshold and a
relatively low ex ante costly screen, but it should rigorously police
functionality.317 Only those aspects of designs that are exclusively
nonfunctional should be accorded copyright protection.318
Design patent law would then serve as the appropriate home for
design elements that are simultaneously functional and nonfunctional.
But it would properly exclude features of designs that are entirely
functional.319 We would also impose a much stricter obviousness screen
on designs than currently exists at the PTO and in the courts. A design
should only qualify for design patent protection when it is truly creative
and new. This would help minimize the number of negative social value
patents.
In an ideal world we might not need costly screens at all. As we
discussed above, however, creativity thresholds are imperfect proxies
for social welfare, and we don’t think courts will get it right all the time.
So it makes sense to impose upon design patent claimants a substantial
costly screen. This includes application and maintenance fees that
more closely track utility patent law, and perhaps an enforcement fee
as well. In addition, in a second-best world we would impose a doctrine
of election that would prevent claimants from asserting both copyright
and design patent rights. The exploitation of overlapping IP rights
wouldn’t be as significant a problem if the law properly defined the
metes and bounds of each type of right, but a doctrine of election would
help to prevent duplicative design rights from slipping through the
cracks.
Establishing a perfect system would require a combination of
legislative, judicial, and administrative action that we suspect is
unlikely to occur. But half steps are better than none, and any of the
proposals we have outlined in this section is likely to improve social
welfare.

317. Although copyright law might not want a costly screen for establishing rights for the
reasons explained by Fagundes & Masur, supra note 12, it should impose increasingly costly
maintenance fees over its long duration to avoid the problems associated with orphan works.
318. The Second Circuit’s opinion in Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d
1142 (2d Cir. 1987), and Judge Kanne’s dissenting opinion in Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene
Prods., 372 F.3d 913, 932 (7th Cir. 2004) (Kanne, J., dissenting), come closest to our view of
copyright’s optimal functionality screen.
319. As a matter of functionality screening, the opinions in Richardson and Apple seem to
strike the balance correctly.
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CONCLUSION
The mechanisms IP law has created to separate design protection
from utility patent protection aren’t working. Today it is too cheap and
too easy to get design protection that is too broad. And because
designers don’t have to choose between IP regimes but can take
advantage of all of them at once, the failure of any particular IP regime
to get the balance right reverberates throughout other doctrines.
We suggest several ways to bring design protection back into
balance. We can make it harder to get stronger rights or rights that
tread on what is properly the ground of utility patent law. We can make
it more expensive for designers to insulate themselves from
competition. And finally, we can force people to choose only one form
of protection for any given design element. Not all of these solutions
will be politically feasible. But alone or in combination, they offer a
framework for a more intelligent system of design rights.
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